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Chapter 1
Introduction
In this dissertation I evaluate policy proposals for three different areas of the labor mar-
ket, namely education, gender inequality, and social networks. The important role of
education in the transition process of young adults into the labor market cannot be
overestimated (see Goldberg and Smith (2008) for an overview occupational effects of
educational systems). Achievement gaps in education between low income or minority
students and their respective counterparts as they are observed in the United States
(see OECD-Report (2012b)) can thus be the reason for a path dependency towards
undesirable labor market outcomes of the individuals. Similarly, gender inequality con-
stitutes another highly relevant aspect of the labor market, as gender gaps in wages
and employment are still prevalent in many countries (for an overview see Altonji and
Blank (1999a)) and are still a source of major policy debates. Attempts to alleviate
the negative outcomes often include affirmative action policies such as mandatory board
room gender quotas as they have been recently introduced in Norway and Germany.
Social networks finally play a highly important role in affecting individual behaviour
and the labor market outcomes of individuals fr instance through job referrals or ed-
ucational choices (see (Jackson and Lopez-Pintado, 2013)). This embeddedness of the
individual in the surrounding environment can be the reason for poverty traps from
which individuals cannot escape easily. Policy measures that are directed at providing
remedies for the challenges in these three areas often times have to be evaluated ex ante
as empirical evidence is typically not available thus rendering a theoretical approach a
necessary alternative. While traditional economic models are one viable approach, in
this dissertation I analyze all policy measures using Agent Based models instead (see
Neugart (2008) for an review of the use of Agent-Based models for the purpose of labor
market policy evaluations). Unlike the standard economic models these provide multiple
useful techniques that proof to be particularly useful in this context, especially when it
comes to taking some of the complexities of the policies and their effect on the economy
1
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into account. In order to provide some initial insight to the overarching methodological
approach of all three analyses, Chapter 2 gives an overview of Agent Based models, and
explains the motivation for using them and typical problems that lend themselves to be
analyzed with Agent Based models.
Afterwards, in Chapter 3 I look into the first policy, namely the effect educational vouch-
ers on educational inequality and inefficiency. The educational sector has displayed a
large degree of heterogeneity with regard to student outcomes (see Book (2012)) in the
past decades and public schools are often named as one of the culprits. The proposal
of educational vouchers has been subject of debates in politics as well as academia.
Proponents argue, that the introduction would serve two purposes at once: 1) Allow
students from low income families to attend better (or more expensive schools) while at
the same time 2) Exerting competitive pressure on public schools in order to increase
their performance. Opponents argue, that this will cause a “cream skimming” effect in
public schools, in the sense that students with higher ability will be the ones predomi-
nantly leaving public schools, thereby exposing the public schools to a deterioration of
the average skills. It is therefore still incumbent on the research in this area to reconcile
these seemingly contradicting predictions. As the educational vouchers have only been
introduced in a few single school districts over the United States, the empirical evidence
is limited. For this reason, I analyze in a computational model what the possible effects
of such a policy could be. I find that for the traditional voucher as it was originally
proposed (which would provide the entire student body with a subsidy) the effects are
ambiguous. While the increased competitive pressure on public schools indeed incen-
tivizes them to increase their performance (measured in expenditure on students) the
deterioration in the form of a decreased mean ability in public schools counterbalances
these welfare gains for students. Then, I analyze an alternative voucher proposal, which
would target students with low ability and provide a higher voucher for students with
low ability. I show that with this system it would be possible to reap the benefits of
increased competition while avoiding the negative effects of ”cream skimming”.
Chapter 4 then analyzes an alternative policy instrument to the fixed gender quota for
the boards of publicly listed companies as it was recently introduced in Germany and
over other countries in Europe. Given the heterogeneous distribution of women over
the various industry sectors, a fixed quota confronts companies with a different degree
of difficulty to fulfil the quota. The case of Norway where the quota was introduced
in 2003 provides empirical evidence of the negative possible effects of such a quota.
The alternative proposal consists of a tradable quota similar to the tradable quotas for
emmission certificates that would allow to alleviate the costs placed by the policy on the
companies while simultaneously achieving the the goal to obtain a certain fraction of
women on the boards industry wide. All of the targeted companies would be provided
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with a certain number of certificates which would allow them to hire men. Companies
operating in industries that have traditionally a higher share of men in the labor force,
would be allowed to hire additional men by buying additional certificates from companies
willing to sell their certificates. Companies having relatively few men on their boards,
would be typically the ones selling certificates. Using an agent based simulation it is
then shown that the alternative proposal is superior in terms of overall welfare to the
fixed quota and achieves the goal at a lower adjustment cost by companies.
In Chapter 5, I evaluate the effects of a labor market policy that provides a subsidy for
the purpose of investing into the education of individuals (e.g. job training, secondary
education). In order to maximize any spillover effects on non-treated individuals, I
examine how the effects of the policy can be increased by taking the position of an
individual in the network into account. Similar policy proposals have been made by
Ballester et al. (2006) who look into crime networks and try to determine how the
overall activity among criminal individuals can be reduced the most by eliminating ties
between the most central (and thereby influential) individuals in a network. Using a
computational model, I show how the overal effect of the policy can be increased by
targeting the most central individuals in the network. However, this comes at the cost
of increasing inequality in the overall network as the agents in the periphery of the
network (who tend to be the least active) fall further behind if the policies focus on the
center of the network. Chapter 6 then concludes.
Chapter 2
Agent-Based Simulation Models
The exponential growth in computing power that characterized the past decades has
introduced a vast array of new methods for analysing economic problems and rendered
the available toolkit much more diverse. Theoretical models were suddenly not as much
dependant on economic tractability but rather allowed for more complex assumptions re-
garding the behavior of agents. While the major fraction of theoretical models relied on
so called standard economic models, that featured an all market encompassing general
equilibrium and agents that are characterized by rational expectations, another strand
of literature emerged that dispensed with the assumptions of equilibria and perfect ra-
tionality, namely agent-based computational economics (ACE). ACE is a computational
approach to economies which are modelled as evolving systems comprised of autonomous
interacting agents (see Tesfatsion and Judd (2006)).
What are some of the advantages of ACE models relative to more standard
modeling approaches?
While the standard economic models focus on the equilibrium behaviour of agents, ACE
models lay emphasis on the dynamics that describe the behaviour of agents apart from
an equilibrium analysis, which may or may not lead to a stable outcome in the long run.
Instead, ACE models comprise a dynamic system of interacting agents and attempts to
gain more insight about about the aggregate outcomes resulting from the individual be-
haviours on the micro level. That is, ACEs allow to model the two-way feedback between
the micro structure and macro structure which takes place in the economy (see Schelling
(1978) and Olson (1965)) that was not possible before. A typical set of elements often
featured in ACE models are inductive learning mechanisms, imperfect competition, en-
dogenous trade network formation, the open-ended co-evolution of individual behaviors
and economic institutions (see Tesfatsion (2002)). The approach of ACE models is often
4
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guided by an attempt to detect an explanation for the emergence of certain global mar-
ket phenomena that have not been obstructed via top-down planning and control. Put
differently, what are the type of behaviours of individuals that may have lead to these
outcomes from the bottom up is the typical question that is addressed. Another very
popular approach (that is also employed in the following chapters) is the attempt to
analyze the implications of certain economic entities or policies (see Dawid and Neugart
(2011)) on the performance of the economy as a whole. Apart from the differences in
equilibrium analysis, a second key departure of ACE models from the standard economic
models is the facility of agents engaging in social communication, thereby allowing for
interactions such as trading and exchanging of informations as it is observed in real-
ity. This type of interaction allows to model in particular how individuals are affected
by their peers in various ways (e.g. educational investment, job referrals etc.) and is
part of the analysis in Chapter 5. Finally, it is often claimed that the core advantage
that sets ACE models apart from the more traditional approach is the autonomy of the
agents (see Jennings (2000)). While it could be argued that the typical representative
consumer in neoclassical models is also characterized by a certain degree of autonomy,
the agent based model extends this autonomy in various ways. It allows for instance to
model the cognitive processes that guide the actions of the individual, e.g. a learning
process through which individuals improve the outcomes of their interactions. This also
includes the alterations of preferences as an outcome of such a learning process. This is
of particular interest as it allows for individuals to have a limited ability to absorb all
available information that is available to them, thereby rendering their behavior more
similar to empirically observed behavioural patterns (see for instance Duffy (2006)). One
important method of calibrating these behavioural patterns to be more realistic is the
approach of using experimental data to parametrize the behavioural functions. A typ-
ical example is the modelling of learning processes through experimental data as done
in the so called Experience Weighted Attraction (EWA) model (see Camerer and Ho
(2008) and Brenner (2006) for a extensive review of the modeling of learning processes),
a method that is also employed in the Chapter 3.
What are some of the disadvantages of ACE models relative to more standard
modeling approaches?
The ability to model the interaction between agents in the model in a detailed fashion
also represents one of the drawbacks of ACE models. It is very well conceivable that
small variations in the specifications of the model can induce strong enough feedbacks
within the model in oder to lead to radically different outcomes. Thus, in order to obtain
sufficiently robust results from a model specification, a wide array of specifications must
be included in the experiments (for an extensive discussion of this argument see Judd
(2006) and Richiardi (2012)).
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The deviation from the principle of an equilibrium to which the model converges intro-
duces another complication for ACE models. The assumption of behavioural patterns
when setting the micro behaviour (which are designed in order to match empirical pat-
terns) causes outcomes that emerge often multi-peaked in the sense that several outcomes
appear most likely to occur, rather than a central tendency. This makes the empirical
validation of these outcomes difficult when it comes to a single observed outcome (e.g.
stock market crash) rather than a distribution of multiple possible outcomes (e.g. a cer-
tain distribution of returns on the stock market). Richiardi et al. (2006) suggests that
validation encompasses a large number of necessary verifications of the model structure,
for instance: 1) Whether the specification still make sense even when inputs take on
extreme values 2) Does the model generate the empirically observed characteristics of
the real system.
Furthermore, Richiardi et al. (2003) point out the ”interpretation problem” of ACE
models, i.e the challenge to extract information from the observed phenomena in the
simulated data regarding the underlying reasons why they occured in that way. One
common approach is the use of econometric techniques to estimate reduced forms on
the artificial data, where the researcher generally knows which parameters affect the
outcomes of interest (since this is part of the specification of the micro rules). However,
this approximation can not be used for further estimation on empirical data, since this
is only a description of how the simulation model works for a given set of structural
parameters. In more intricate models, the causal links between inputs and outputs
might then be indirect and remain difficult to detect.
Some of the areas where ACE models provide a very useful methodological approach is
the modelling of economic activity in exogenously determined networks. The particular
design of a model consisting of individual autonomous agents lends itself to a network
analysis where one can track the flow of information to and from any particular agent and
look at the implications that results from the network structure (see for a review Wilhite
(2006)). Chapter 5 employs such a network structure to analyze the diffusion processes
that result from providing labor market policies to individuals embedded in a social
network. A highly related field is modelling of endogenized interactions where the agents
not only interact with other agent but also determine through their own preferences who
they actually interact with (for a review see Vriend (2006)). A prominent example of such
endogenized interactions is Schelling (1971)’s spatial proximity model of neighborhood
segregation which features two types of agents. He demonstrates how even slightest
preferences of the agents for neighbors of their own kind among the agents can lead to
a highly segregated distribution of agents in the steady state even if the distribution
is strongly integrated in the initial state. The set of possible applications also extends
into models in finance, that allow to model the behaviour of agents in the stock market
Chapter 2. Agent-Based Simulation Models 7
while including agents that make trading decisions based on different heuristics or rule
of thumb strategies which may not be perfect but are able to replicated stylized facts
reasonable well (for an overview see Hommes (2006). ACE models are furthermore
applied to topics in labor economics (for a survey of the agent based labor market models
see Neugart et al. (2012)), typically to either explain stylized facts of labor market data
(e.g. the Beveridge curve, the wage curve, the wage distribution etc.) or to analyze the
implications of labor market policies (e.g. training policies, unemployment benefits).
The latter approach is used in this dissertation, i.e. the evaluations conducted have in
common the attempt to predict the outcomes of policies for which empirical evidence
is either not available or very limited. Neugart et al. (2012) point out that one of the
main advantages of ACE models in labor market models is the possibility of a flexible
model design that allow to weaken many of the standard assumptions simultaneously.
What are the typical steps involved in an ACE model? An initiation, the ACE
models is populated with a group of agents. These can represent anything from eco-
nomic agents such as financial institutions or traders, or government institutions. These
agents feature initial characteristic attributes (e.g. financial endowment, behavioural
patterns). In a further step the behavioural patterns of all agents in the model are set
using functions that model their behavior. As pointed out before, this could be based on
empirical or experimental data where individuals react to the events in the model based
on a function. This could also consist of allowing the agents to adjust their behavior
based on information gained through a learning process (e.g. the agents could evaluate
the outcomes of their previous actions in order learn through trial and error). In addition
to the actual functional form of the behavioural patterns, the parametrization of these
functions imposes a further challenge to the modeller. The proper calibration might
require using empirical or experimental data that provides information on how the de-
tailed reaction functions of agents might be best defined. The particular procedure in a
model is often documented with pseudocode or chart flow diagrams. Then, the modeller
either allows for the model to evolve for a while and then introduces a policy measure
or does not intervene further . That is, the subsequent events arising, must arise from
the interactions occurring within the model (i.e. without any exogenous impositions
of market clearing conditions or optimality conditions). Once results are obtained, the
interpretation and validation of these findings can include various steps. One possi-
ble approach is to use standard statistical or econometric methods, such as comparing
means and distributions of those variables of interest. Another popular approach is the
estimation of reduced form models as pointed out above to obtain an understanding of
the underlying mechanics.
Chapter 3
Do Educational Vouchers Reduce
Inequality and Inefficiency in
Education?1
3.1 Introduction
The topic of poor public school performance is still subject of major policy debates and
is ever more interesting in light of the great achievement gaps between low-income or mi-
nority students and their respective counterparts as suggested for instance by the PISA
assessment for the United States. The survey finds that “[s]ocio-economic disadvantage
has a notable impact on student performance in the United States” (OECD-Report
(2012b)). In particular school systems that are highly stratified tend to perform worse
in terms of student test scores (OECD-Report (2012a)). This is also reflected by the
extensive reports by the National Center for Educational Statistics (Vanneman et al.
(2009) and Hemphill and Vanneman (2011)). One proposed strategy for improving pub-
lic school performance that has received increasing academic and public attention is
to introduce competition through the provision of private school vouchers to students,
which would grant them financial aid if they chose to attend a private school. The
vouchers would provide a large student body with the opportunity to attend any school
of their choice rather than having to attend the public neighborhood school, and thereby
create competitive pressure for all public schools in the respective school district. The
1This Chapter is based on Akyol (2016a)
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idea is based on the paradigm that, analogous to other markets, schools having to com-
pete for students, will enhance efficiency and improve the quality of their “product”, i.e.
educational experience for the students attending.2
Several aspects particularly relevant to the introduction of a voucher system warrant
special attention. Will the program actually benefit students from low income families or
minorities who are attending low performing schools with lower quality peer groups, i.e.
will the prevalent stratification and inequality in education be reduced? Will the public
schools actually get better and increase their efficiency or rather be gradually be exposed
to “cream skimming”, i.e. a deteriorating peer group? This is of high relevance as it
affects the peer group of both school systems. There is a rich empirical literature that
presents strong evidence for the role of peer effects in primary and secondary education
(for an extensive review see Epple and Romano (2011) or Sacerdote (2011)). Coleman
et al. (1966) for instance use survey data and confirm the crucial role of peer effects and
find that they are even more important for disadvantaged students. Summers and Wolfe
(1977) also find that the peer group effects play a significant role in educational outcomes
(see Calvo-Armengol et al. (2009a), McEwan (2003), Gaviria and Raphael (2001) and
Zimmerman (2003) for results in a similar vein). It would thus be of interest to provide
a comprehensive approach that would allow to engage into the complexities of the topic
along multiple lines, i.e. efficiency concerns and distribution of students. The empirical
literature on educational vouchers typically only focuses on certain aspects of the voucher
program. Thus, as Nechyba (2000) puts it “...[empirical] work may not anticipate all
the impacts from a large-scale policy...At the same time, theoretical models or school
finance are also limited in that they often either focus on only one particular aspect
of the general equilibrium school finance problem, or are they too rich and complex to
yield crisp predictions. It is for this reason that there is great potential for simulation
approaches...”.3
In this paper, I implement an agent-based simulation model of a representative US
school district which draws on the seminal contributions of Manski (1992) and Epple
and Romano (1998, 2008). I use the model to analyze the effect of a voucher program on
inequality and inefficiency in the educational system.4 The contribution of this paper is a
twofold approach that allows for an endogenized reaction of public schools to increased
competition on the one hand and to track the distribution of students to schools in
order to evaluate peer group effects on the other hand. In particular, I extend the above
2The idea dates far back, Thomas Paine for instance proposed a voucher plan in 1792, in The Rights
of Man, for a discussion see West (1967). The more recent awakening of interest is typically credited to
Friedman (1955, 1962, 1997)
3Two recent papers that allow for richer complexities to enter and that take into account the general
equilibrium effects are Epple et al. (2013)and Fu (2014).
4See Spiro Maroulis and Wilensky (2014) for an approach to model the transition period for public
choice in an agent-based model
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mentioned models to account for the heterogeneity of the student body, as the agent
based approach allows a much more detailed modeling of the individual behavior of
the students.5 Specifically, students have varying characteristics in multiple dimensions
that are orthogonal to each other. Thus, I obtain distributions of students to schools
that are only based on the inherent characteristics of students and their resulting school
choices. The model then simulates how various student groups are affected not only
by the introduction of the voucher program but also by the choices of their peers (and
possible feedback effects). Using this approach I then I compare the effects of universal
vouchers and target vouchers (which are a function of student characteristics), and
compare outcomes for different distributions of income and ability.
The main findings indicate that the outcomes of a voucher program hinge on the design
of the programs. First, I find that a higher number of students being able to afford to
switch from public to private school (and thereby are able to exert competitive pressure
on public schools as their children do not default into public school) causes an increase in
public school performance. This effect can be created either by a change in distribution
of family incomes (i.e. increasing the number of families in the middle class relative to
the low income class) or through the distribution of vouchers in order to increase the
available funds to families. This outcome is confirmed by empirical studies listed below,
which find that public schools do react to higher competition.
Second, when looking at the effect of changes in the universal voucher level, the findings
are similar to the results observed in (Manski, 1992) and Epple and Romano (1998,
2008). While students actually exercising choice profit from a voucher system, the effect
on students remaining in their original schools is less clear. Given that the majority
of students exercising choice and leaving into better schools have mostly higher ability
levels, the students staying behind observe a decline in the peer group quality (“cream
skimming”). Contrary to these papers, the endogenized reaction of public schools allows
for them to react to a sudden decline in student enrollment by adjusting educational
quality accordingly. Thus, the low performing schools actually increase their educational
service to retain students, that is, the “cream skimming” effect, is partly alleviated
through this effect.
Finally, when the model is extended to allow for so called target vouchers, which are a
function of the ability level or the family income of the respective students, the observed
deterioration effect is avoided in the case of ability vouchers. Public schools observe
less of a decline in their mean ability while maintaining the increase in public school
expenditure. Thus, ability vouchers allow to obtain the benefits of higher competition
5Lavecchia et al. (2014) provide a survey of recent applications of behavioral economics to the eco-
nomics of education and provide a framework for modeling the decision making processes of parents and
students while taking into account their limited rationality.
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while circumventing the detrimental peer group effects. The concern to what extent this
policy alternative would actually be feasible is discussed in that section.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 3.2 contains a literature review.
In Section 5.2, I lay out the details of the model that I employ. Section 5.3 and section
5.3.3 present results from the case for universal vouchers and the case of target vouchers,
respectively. Section 3.6 presents a number of robustness tests, section 6 then concludes.
3.2 Literature Review
There is no shortage of diverging arguments about possible effects of a voucher program
on efficiency of public schools but also the distributional aspects, i.e. which students
will actually benefit. Hoxby (2003b) for instance makes the case, that economic logic
suggests that choice will enhance productivity, and render distributional concerns less
relevant, as an overall improved school system will help to improve all students’ educa-
tional experience (“...a rising tide that lifts all boats”). MacLeod and Urquiola (2012)
argue, that the argument for more incentives through competition does not take the
idiosyncrasies of the educational system into account, that would make this prediction
fail. In fact, they show that if one applies the theory of incomplete markets and incom-
plete contracts to the educational system, the predictions must be much more nuanced,
and that there is no a priori reason to conclude that the introduction will in fact benefit
all students.
The empirical research provides mixed results of voucher programs and supports the
argument that expectations of educational vouchers improving the educational out-
comes throughout all student groups should be tempered. Barrow and Rouse (2008)
and MacLeod and Urquiola (2012), both provide a survey of empirical studies of the
so called direct effect, i.e. the resulting changes in individual test scores when students
switch from public to private schools. They find that a large number of programs only
reveal a small or insignificant effect on student test scores when switching from public
to private school (see for instance Neal (2002)). A sizable number of empirical studies
also estimate the indirect effect or general equilibrium effect, i.e. the reaction of public
schools to increased competition.6 Levin and Belfield (2002) provide an extensive review
of the empirical literature and find that a majority of studies report beneficial effects
of competition, however the positive gains from competition are modest in scope with
respect to realistic changes in levels of competition. Greene (2001), Greene and Winters
(2003) and Figlio and Rouse (2006) for instance look at evidence from the voucher pro-
gram introduced in Florida in 1999 and 2002 in which schools that did not have mean
6Albeit the number of studies is comparably small given the plethora of studies for the direct effect
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test scores above a certain threshold were threatened to have their students become
eligible for vouchers if they did not meet the criteria a second time. They find that the
respective schools achieved test score gains that were twice as large as those achieved by
other schools. West and Peterson (2006) also find positive effects on test performances
of students at the threatened schools. Hoxby (2003b,a) looks at the program in Mil-
waukee and also finds a positive productivity response in public schools. Chakrabarti
(2013) compares both programs, Milwaukee and Florida, and finds that the “threatening
design” of the Florida program produced larger gains in productivity, and thus high-
lights that the incentive design of the voucher program is paramount in order to achieve
productivity gains. Rouse et al. (2013) and Chiang (2009) argue that these positive
results might not reflect genuine improvement but could result from “gaming” behav-
iors (focusing teaching efforts on students at the threshold of failing etc.). They find
that threatened schools improved instructional practices which are explanatory for the
observed higher test scores in the voucher program. Misra et al. (2012) use Geographi-
cal Information System (GIS) data to develop a school competition index for the state
Mississippi and find that higher degrees of competition from private schools significantly
increases public primary and high school efficiency in terms of test scores. Bayer and
McMillan (2010) also find a positive effect of increased competition using data from the
San Francisco Bay Area. From a review of the empirical literature it thus seems that
there is potential for an improved public school system through pressure and also for
small direct effects on students who switch to public school.7
Manski (1992) was among the first to develop a theoretical and computational analysis
of vouchers and was highly influential for following research.8 He finds a varying effect on
the poor of a voucher program, as the ones staying behind in public school are worse off
because their peer group deteriorates, while the few ones who switch to private schools
are better off. At the same time, for the case of rent seeking public schools, he finds a
decrease in their rents with the introduction of the voucher program. Epple and Romano
(1998) analyze vouchers in a framework with peer effects that allows schools to put a
price on the peer externality and charge students their reservation prices. They find
a similar effect of a deteriorating peer group in public schools (or “cream skimming”),
while a typical hierarchy of private schools results along with an ”income and ability
stratification” (in Epple et al. (2004) they provide empirical evidence for these findings).
As the introduction of a voucher system hinges on the ability to gather enough political
support, Epple and Romano (2014) examine the conditions under which such a system
would be preferred. They show that the coefficient of variation in the wealth level of an
7Throughout this paper it is assumed that peer effects occur in a homogeneous fashion, i.e. individuals
assigned to a certain peer group such as a classroom or school experience the same effects. Carrell et al.
(2013) uses experimental data to show how individuals can be affected differently by their peer group
due to a tendency to form homogeneous subgroups.
8For a recent survey of the theoretical modeling advances see Epple and Romano (2012)
Chapter 3. Educational Vouchers 13
economy is the relevant statistic determining whether a voucher is politically supported.9
Epple and Romano (2008) extend the analysis and allow for a ’target voucher’ which is a
function of ability and demonstrate that it can eliminate cream skimming and “reap the
competitive efficiency gains ... with gains shared by all students”, i.e. the voucher leads
to an elimination of public schools and a homogeneous private schools which admit
a cross section of all students. Thus, the voucher results in no stratification and the
schools spending all the voucher money on expenditure. Nechyba (2000) also models
target vouchers which are a function of income or are specifically targeted to low income
neighborhoods and finds that overall variances on school quality variables could actually
decline. Caucutt (2002) finds that target vouchers which are predominantly provided
to low income students entail adverse effects on inequality and higher welfare losses
compared to the general vouchers case.10 This paper extends these models by allowing
for an endogenous reaction of public schools to the educational vouchers and thereby
evaluate the efficiency effects and the peer effects from the resulting redistribution of
students to schools.
3.3 The Model
3.3.1 Model Specification
The model represents a typical school district in the United States that is comprised of
a public sector and a private sector, which both compete with each other for students.
Both sectors set control variables simultaneously at the beginning of each period in
order to maximize their respective objective function, and are homogenous with respect
to all characteristics. They have restricted knowledge of each others payoffs, i.e. there
is no perfect information and either side can merely observe the other sides’ policies
after they have been implemented. Students then rank both sectors according to the
possible utility they would gain from attending each sector and then choose the higher
ranked sector. Schools are entirely transparent for households regarding the achievement
of the students enrolled and the expenses per student. This appears to be a realistic
assumption given the information that is made publicly available in many school districts
in the United States. The schools then observe enrollment and use a learning mechanism
in order to adjust their control variables in the next period.
9See Glomm and Ravikumar (1998) and Glomm et al. (2011) for a theoretical modeling of the voting
process when public and private education alternatives exists
10See also Chen and West (2000) and Piolatto (2010), both papers show in a theoretical model how
a system of selective vouchers would be superior to universal vouchers and would be preferred by the
majority of voters
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3.3.2 Household Characteristics
The model is populated with n heterogeneous households. Each household i has an
income, denoted as yi, and has one student who has an ability of bi. Furthermore, each
household has a private school preference pi, which is a continuous variable measuring
the idiosyncratic preference of a student for private school relative to public school,
where pi is distributed normal with variance one and mean µ, pi ∼ N (µ,1).11 I assume
that y, b, and p are distributed independently of one another. This simplification assures
that the results are driven solely by our behavioral assumptions rather than any initial
distributional assumptions. This assumptions serves the purpose of warranting that any
of the distributional outcomes will solely emerge from the behavioral assumptions of the
heterogeneous households and public and private schools, instead of being driven by any
a priori assumptions about the initial distribution.12
In particular, b and y have uniform distributions, f(b) and f(y), which are assumed to
be continuous and positive on their support, Sb = [0, bmax] and Sy = [0, ymax].
Households maximize their utility function, Uis = U(·), through their choice of school,
s, for the household’s student. U(·) is increasing in the consumption of a numeraire
good, the mean ability of the student body, ms, and the instructional expenditure of
the school, es, and is continuous and twice differentiable in all arguments. Educational
attainment for student i, ai = a(ms,es), is a function of ms and es and is a non negative,
and increasing in both arguments. By taking ms into account, households consider the
peer-group effect in their choice of school.13 Let ts be the tuition charged at school s,
and vis the voucher that student i receives for attending schools s, then we have:
Uis(·) = U(yi − ts + vis,ms, es, pi) (3.1)
with U’() positive for all arguments.14
11Similar to Manski (1992) I use pi to adjust initial enrollment in public/private schools to reflect
more realistically the empirically observed ratio of students in private vs. public schools, it can reflect
various forces: preference for religious relative to secular schooling, the time required to commute to a
private school relative to public school etc.
12This assumption is relaxed in the robustness section with the main results being unaffected.
13See Henderson et al. (1978), Summers and Wolfe (1977), and Hoxby (2000) who provide empirical
evidence for a peer group effect in educational achievement
14As Epple and Romano (1998, 2008) I assume that Ui(·) satisfies everywhere the “single crossing”
condition in income yi and in ability bi, that is:
∂(
∂U/∂e
∂U/∂ts
)/∂yi > 0 (3.2)
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As mentioned above, the model abstracts away from informational issues, students are
thus perfectly informed about school characteristics as they rank schools. In particular,
households maximize utility, Uis = Uis(·), through their choice of school s. In order
to preclude kickbacks by schools, that is schools that enter the market at the lower
spectrum of educational quality and attract particularly low income students by kicking
back monies of the voucher, the condition ts ≥ vis is introduced. This does not preclude
topping up by participating schools, thus schools are allowed to charge a higher tuition
than the voucher amount if they deem it appropriate in order to maximize their objective
function. The utility function of household i in Equation 3.1 for attending school s is
then given by:
Uis =αilog(es) + βims + γlog(yi −max{ts + vis, 0}) + pi (3.4)
with αi = α(bi), βi = β(bi), and γ > 0, where α
′() and β′() are all positive, i.e. students
with higher intrinsic ability, ceteris paribus, value the educational quality and peer
quality of each respective school higher than students with lower intrinsic ability.15
3.3.3 School Characteristics
Schools are divided into public and private, with schools being homogeneous within
each sector. Every student can choose between the public school sector (s = 0) and
the private school sector (s = 1), whereas the former is available for free and preferred
to no schooling, that is, tuition t0 for public schools is set to zero, while tuition for
private schools is endogenous. School finance policy warrants public and private schools a
funding of vis that is proportional to enrollment and a function of student characteristics
(in case of target vouchers). Each school chooses their expenditure per student, es, and
has a publicly known mean student ability, ms, which is endogenous. Both, es and ms
constitute educational quality for the school. The amount of funding for the schools
depends on the type of policy that is examined. For the sake of simplicity of notation, I
will refer to all forms of funds from the government to schools (be it public or private)
as a voucher, vs. This voucher will be stable in size for public schools throughout all
policy experiments, while it will be varied for private schools.
and:
∂(
∂U/∂e
∂U/∂ts
)/∂bi > 0 (3.3)
where e represents educational quality, either as expenditure per student or the mean ability of students
enrolled in that particular school. Equation 3.2 implies that in the (e,ts)-plane, the indifference curves
of students with the same motivation are becoming steeper as income increases. This is equivalent to
saying that income elasticity of demand for educational quality is positive, i.e. educational quality is a
normal good. Analogously, 3.3 implies a positive motivation elasticity of demand for educational quality.
15See Rothstein (2006) for evidence of how parents are evaluating schools by peers and school quality.
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3.3.4 Public Sector Schools
Public schools do not face within sector competition and offer free admission to all
students.16 They are local monopolists, in the sense that each each sector has only one
public school, and given this lack of competition they are not required to expend all of
their revenue in a way that benefits their students (this could be considered a profit that
is not used for the benefit of the student body or a bureaucratic inefficiency).
Thus, the public sector can set expenditure e0 such that their maximization problem
yields a surplus:
max
es
n∑
i=0
(1− ci)(vs − es) (3.5)
where ci is an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 when student i is enrolled in
private school, with n being the number of students.
While this allows each public school to accrue a surplus at the end of each period, it does
not imply that public schools actually do so. It is very well possible for public schools
to expend all of their surplus to become more attractive to students in their district.
A number of empirical studies (see (Hoxby, 2003b)) find that increased competition in
a school district actual leads to an increased performance of public schools (measured
through students’ achievement). The goal of this modeling approach is to examine
if (under the assumption that public schools do have a surplus and thus ability to
increase their expenditure) the introduction of increased competition actually does lead
an increased expenditure in the sense that public school surplus is reduced. It should
be also noted that it is indeed conceivable that the improved public school performance
works through a ”non-monetary” channel, i.e. public schools improve while maintaining
expenditure. While this is not explicitly modeled here, the implications would be similar
to the degree that public schools in both scenarios do have some slack in their ability to
increase performance, be it through ”monetary” or ”non-monetary” channels.
3.3.5 Private Sector Schools
Private schools act competitively as the typical schools district consists of numerous
private schools and students who are able to afford private school tuition are able to
16The fact that about 90 percent of the student body attends public schools, and 70 percent attend
their local neighborhood school, supports this assertion (see Statistical Abstract of the US Book (2012)).
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choose between these various options.17 They set their tuition, ts, and their expenditure,
es, to maximize their preliminary objective function:
max
ts,es
n∑
i=0
ci(ts + vs − es) (3.6)
Since the entry into and exit from the private school market is not very costly, I assume
that private school sector is forced to act competitively. This is corroborated by the
relatively large number of students who default into their local public school as previously
mentioned, while the remaining students choose a private school and thereby exert
competitive pressure on these schools which precludes private schools from accumulating
any profits within a period, i.e. they set their expenditure, e1, such that equation 3.6
becomes zero18 at all times, we thus have:
n∑
i=0
ci(ts + vs − es) = 0 (3.7)
Private schools then choose ts and thereby set es, i.e. the maximization problem reduces
to the determination of ts. They do not face any restrictions with the introduction of
the voucher, i.e. they may charge tuition above the voucher level. I assume that private
schools then set tuition in such a way, as to maximize private school sector enrollment,
i.e. the maximization problem of the private sector becomes:
max
t1
n∑
i=0
ci (3.8)
Thus, private schools attempt to maximize their enrollment through their choice of tu-
ition, t1. One possible motivation for this modeling strategy is that the market structure
of the private school sector can be thought of a as monopolistic competition, where the
schools differentiate their services through advertising and other non-price strategies and
have some pricing power. In the short run, it will then be possible for schools to accrue
profits. However, because there are relatively low entry and exit costs, new schools
will enter the market and in the long run, drive prices and revenues down toward an
equilibrium similar to perfect competition, where profits are close to zero.
17An alternative modeling strategy could be to take the reputation of schools into consideration which
could hinder new entries, see MacLeod and Urquiola (2009).
18this is analogue to the approach in (Manski, 1992). Epple and Romano (2008) use a similar condition
to characterize profits of private schools in equilibrium close to zero.
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3.3.6 School Behavior
The complexity of the presented model precludes a closed form solution for the endoge-
nous variables, i.e. public school expenditure and private school tuition.19 Instead,
I employ the Experience-Weighted Attraction (EWA) model as suggested by Camerer
and Ho (1999). The authors developed their model as an approach to determine how an
equilibrium arises in non-cooperative games where it is conceivable that agents are not
able to reason their way but rather adapt or evolve toward it. They diverged in their
approach from the largely theoretical literature on evolutionary and adaptive process
as they used experimental data to specify a model that would describe actual human
learning and adaption best. The basic mechanism consists of two fundamental types of
learning processes, reinforcement learning and belief learning and treats both as bor-
der cases for the model’s parameters. Reinforcement learning is closely related to the
concept from behavioral psychology and describes an individuals behavior as the result
of the positive feedback received in the past. Belief learning on the other hand models
how players engage in dynamic games in which they try to optimize their behavior using
a prediction rule, which provides a forecast of other player’s behavior as a function of
their past history. As such, the EWA model constitutes a general learning model that
features two traditional learning models as extreme cases. The model has experimen-
tal evidence supporting the algorithm and the choice of parameters (see Camerer and
Ho (2008) and Brenner (2006)). In the context of this paper, the algorithm is used to
model the path towards a stable outcome of the model in which the schools get as close
as possible to maximizing their objective functions (given their control variables, i.e.
public school expenditure and private school tuition).20 The obtained outcome satisfies
household utility maximization, and an approximate school’s profit maximization given
the respective other sector’s choice. That is, both sectors do not have an incentive to
unilaterally deviate from the given outcome.21
More specifically, the EWA Model assigns attraction levels to all possible strategies for
the control variables based on previous payoffs or preconceived beliefs and maps those
into probabilities for actual choices. In this context the attraction levels are a 1 to 1
mapping of the payoffs of the schools, that is, the payoffs for public schools are their
profits while the payoff for private schools is their enrollment. These payoffs are a result
19See Scotchmer and Wooders (1987) and Scotchmer (1997), who show that this problem is pervasive
to club economies, whereas the case of private schools can be seen as an example of clubs with “non-
anonymous crowding”. Manski (1992) employs a numerical simulation through all possible combinations
of endogenous variables and then solves for a unique equilibrium using backward induction from the
public school’s perspective, given that they are dominant and the private sector consists only of small
firms that take the actions of the public school sector as given. Fu (2014) employs a similar approach
with a sequential game and then determines the sub-game perfect Nash equilibria that emerge.
20This is somewhat similar to the “epsilon-equilibrium” of Epple and Romano (1998)
21See Fowler (2011) who uses an Agent Based Model to replicate the results of a Core-Periphery Model
and obtains a comparable equilibrium condition.
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of the chosen strategies for the control variables, i.e. e0 for public schools and t1 for
private schools. Each period after one strategy is drawn from the distribution, the
attraction or payoff for that particular strategy is updated based on the current period’s
payoff and the discounted previous periods payoff. For instance, the public schools
choose a certain e0 from a probability distribution and observe the profits that result
from this choice, while the private schools simultaneously choose t1 and observe their
enrollment. Both schools repeat this process in the subsequent periods, while gradually
observing increased payoffs for certain strategies. Strategies with higher payoffs are
chosen more frequently then. The attraction or payoff for each respective strategy j at
time t for school s is given by:
Ajs,(t) =
{φNt−1Ajs,t−1 + [δ + (1− δ) ∗ I(sjs = ss,t)]pis(sjs, s−s,t)}
Nt
(3.9)
with φ as a depreciation factor of previous attraction levels, and where δ represents the
weight put on the fact whether a strategy has been employed before or not (where δ = 0
and δ = 1 constitute the border cases for reinforcement learning and belief learning).
Then ss,t denotes the strategy employed by school sector s at period t, s−s,t is the
strategy employed by the respective other school sector at period t, I(sjs, ss,t) is an
indicator function which equals one if sjs = sst and zero otherwise. Finally, pis(s
j
s, s−s,t)
is a payoff that sector s obtains if strategy sjs is chosen and the other sector chooses
s−s. Nt is the law of motion for the experience weight which depreciates payoffs from
previous periods:
Nt = ρNt−1 + 1 (3.10)
where ρ is a discount factor.
The model is initialized with N(t) and Ajt according to beliefs about what experience the
actors might be able to draw from, given similar other situations. The attraction levels
of each strategy are then mapped into a probability for each strategy j to be chosen by
sector s. Thus public schools have attraction levels for each possible level of expenditure
and private schools have a attraction levels for each possible level of tuition. Each sector
then draws from a Logit formulation to make a choice for the next period level for the
respective control variable, which is then given by:
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P ji,t+1 =
eλA
j
t∑mi
k=1 e
λAjt
(3.11)
where λ > 0 and measures the sensitivity of schools to the attraction of one particular
strategy and mi is the number of possible strategies that sector s can employ.
3.3.7 Policies
3.3.7.1 Universal Vouchers
I first simulate a universal voucher which is provided to all students independently of
income or ability. The related literature has mainly focused on these type of “flat-rate”
vouchers (see for instance Rangazas (1995), Epple and Romano (1996), Hoyt and Lee
(1998), Caucutt (2002), Nechyba (1999, 2000, 2003), Ferreyra (2007)). In this setting
the private school sector receives a voucher, v1 for each student that is enrolled in the
school, while not facing an upper boundary on the tuition that is set. As mentioned
above, in order to obviate schools from offering particularly low educational expenditure
and kicking back money to students,22 private schools are required to charge tuition at
least as high as the voucher amount, v1. This scenario subsumes the case of no voucher,
where only public schools receive government funding, v0, for each student and private
schools are only financed through tuition. Notice that the funding for public schools
remains constant throughout all policy experiments.
3.3.7.2 Target Vouchers
In a second setting, I simulate the effects of target vouchers, which allow to make the
tuition a function of student characteristics such as ability or income. While these
do not have many real world counterparts, the idea behind target vouchers here is
to devise a system that is more purposefully oriented towards the needs of the low
income students than a universal voucher system. Epple and Romano (2008) study the
effects of such an alternative voucher system that would allow to reap the benefits of
increased competition between schools while curbing stratification effects. They show
that voucher systems that condition awards on student ability can eliminate stratification
and distribute benefits of increased competition. As they do not allow for public schools
to react to the increased competition or for income vouchers, it is not obvious whether
22Epple and Romano (1998) use a similar restriction to exclude “bottom feeder” schools
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their results for ability vouchers continue to hold under these more relaxed conditions
or what the effects of income vouchers would be. It should also be noted that there
are currently no real world counterparts of vouchers that are negatively correlated with
student ability. One of the challenges of such a system would be the fact that the true
ability of students is not observable to the policy maker, the feasibility thus hinges on
the possibility of using an appropriate proxy for the unobserved ability. One possible
approach could be to employ test scores as a proxy for ability and use them both, to
assign the voucher and for admission decision. If ability is determined by examination
in the process of admission to schools, there is no incentive to under-perform, i.e. this
approach could be a viable attempt to render truthful ability revelation that is also
incentive compatible.
3.3.8 Model Calibration
The parameters of the household utility function, U(·) are αi = α(bi), βi = β(bi),
which are assumed to be continuous and positive on their support, Sα = [2.5, 5] and
Sβ = [1, 2] , and γ = 25.
23 The private school preference parameter µ is set such that
the initial enrollment ratio between public and private schools reflects the empirically
observed ratio in the Unites States, i.e. about 92% of the student body is enrolled in
public school with the remainder being enrolled in private school.24 This type of initial
distribution is obtained for µ = −2.5, and simply shifts the distribution while leaving
the qualitative and quantitative results unaffected. Ability, b, and the family income, y
have a uniform distribution on their support, Sb = [0, 100] and Sy = [0, 100] (where y is
denoted in multiples of one thousand).
The simulations are first performed under varying income distributions and then under
varying distributions of student ability. For both cases the school district consists of
families from five annual income groups, which are defined in Table 3.1:
The income is distributed uniformly within these intervals. The simulations are per-
formed with the following distributions for the comparison of income distributions:
• all families are in the middle class (Gini coefficient: 0.05)
• all classes contain 20% of families (Gini coefficient: 0.33).
23The current parameter values imply that students at the upper end of the ability spectrum would
like to spend 16% of their income on education in the optimum (for the students at the lower end this
would be 9% of income), the derivation is provided in the Appendix. Epple and Romano (1998) point
out that the current percentage of aggregate disposable personal income for the United States which is
spent on education is close to 5.6 %
24See Digest of Education Statistics 2014
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Table 3.1: Income Distribution
class lower boundary upper boundary
low $0 $20,000
lower middle $20,001 $40,000
middle $40,001 $60,000
upper middle $60,001 $80,000
high $80,001 $100,000
Note that throughout both distributions the average income remains unchanged at $
50,000, thus all the observed effects result only from the change in the distribution.
The number of students is set such that the results obtained are stable, particularly to
warrant that the learning mechanism of the schools receive enough feedback (for N very
small, the inflow of new students each period does not guarantee a correct feedback for
the payoff function). For this purpose N ≥ 100 is appropriate.
In order to compare the role of inequality in ability I examine the following two alter-
native settings:
• all students have an ability between 40 and 60.
• all students have an ability between 0 and 100.
Notice that the for each respective comparison, the other variable is set to the unequal
distribution. That is, while income distribution is varied, I use the ability distribution
for students between 0 and 100 and while varying student ability, the income distribution
is set to the unequal case.
The public schools receive funding proportional to enrollment, i.e. they receive a “public
voucher” equal to $6000 (v0 = 6). Voucher levels for private schools vary from zero
(v1 = 0), to $2,000 (v1 = 2), to $4,000 (v1 = 4) per student in the case of a universal
voucher and vary from zero (v1 = 0), to $4,000 (v1 = 4), to $8,000 (v1 = 8) per student
in the case of a target voucher. The parameters of the EWA model are ρ = 0.01, φ = 0.9,
λ = 5, N0 = 1, and δ = 1.
25
For each scenario the simulation iterates through 100 runs, while each single run consists
of 500 time steps. For the analysis below, I record the values of all reported variables
from the final time step and then show the respective boxplots or show the averages of
the those final values from all 100 runs. Thus, for every policy experiment I have 100
observations.
25Camerer and Ho (1999) provide experimental evidence for a similar calibration. In the section 3.6
the simulations are run under numerous variations of the choice of parameters for EWA.
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3.4 Computational Results
3.4.1 Universal Vouchers- Varying Income Distribution
I begin describing the results for the case of universal vouchers, which are provided to
all the students independently of their characteristics. As described above, I examine
three voucher levels: a baseline case with no vouchers, to a voucher level of $2,000 and
a voucher level of $4,000. Additionally, I run all simulations with the two previously
mentioned distributions, i.e. one case with all families having a family income within
the middle class (uniformly within $40,0001 to $60,001) and one case where all classes
contain 20% of the families. I refer to the previous one, as the equal distribution, whereas
the latter will be referred to as the unequal distribution. I report all simulation results
using box plots which are created using 100 observations for each treatment.
The first finding I describe is the effect of higher competition on the behavior of private
and public schools. A change in competition can enter the school district in two ways,
either in the form of voucher or through a change in the income distribution. Both
increase the number of students who are close to the threshold of being able to choose
between public and private school and thereby decrease the number of students who
default into public schools. The control variables of public schools and private schools
are expenditure per student and tuition, respectively. Both are depicted in Figure 3.1.
The left panel shows the public school reaction to the introduction of vouchers under
the two different distributions. The first column displays the expenditure level for a
voucher equal to zero (baseline setting). Initially, public schools’ mean expenditure is
at $2,900 for the equal distribution and $2,200 for the unequal distribution.26 Once the
vouchers are introduced (columns two and three) we can observe the public schools in-
creasing their expenditure along with the increase in voucher level for both distributions.
This reaction can be explained by the relative attractiveness of private schools which in-
creases as the voucher increases, as they make private schools more affordable to a larger
group of students. Public schools observe that they are exposed to a higher degree of
competition as more of their students are suddenly able to afford private schools as an
alternative. This leads to a sudden decline in their enrollment and thus causes them to
increase their “attractiveness” in response by adjusting their educational expenditure
upwards. This is the effect of increased competition, the so called indirect effect or gen-
eral equilibrium effect. Comparing the two distributions we can see that the spending
of public schools is higher in the equal distribution at all times. This can be explained
by the fact, that with more students in the middle income class, the number of students
that default into public school (and thus do not have choice) is lower. Thus, public
26 The mean values of all graphs in this section and the following are available upon request.
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Figure 3.1: Public School Expenditure(a) and Private School Tuition(b)
schools face a higher competitive pressure in the equal distribution and respond with
higher educational quality. This effect is in line with the above cited empirical findings
for schools facing higher competition.
The right panel in Figure 3.1 shows the values for the optimal private school tuition in
all three voucher scenarios for both distributions. The first column displays the tuition
values again for a voucher equal to zero, where tuition for the unequal setting is slightly
above $10,000 and slightly below $9,000 for the equal distribution. Private schools are
maximizing the enrollment in their sector by adjusting the tuition in order to cater to
the needs of potential students. Private schools face a trade off with tuition as it enters
student utility twice. It affects utility negatively as it lowers the family income (since
the family has to pay the tuition) but it also increases utility as private schools use
their entire tuition as expenditure which enters student utility positively. Thus private
schools attempt to find a value for tuition (and thereby expenditure) in each scenario
that maximizes enrollment. In order to find this optimal value, they employ the above
mentioned learning algorithm. Now once the vouchers are introduced we can see that the
tuition is lowered by a value which is very close to the voucher level as can be seen in the
two columns to the right. The private schools now receive a voucher from each student
of $2,000 or $4,000 and lower their tuition by this amount. Given that private school
expenditure is the sum of all payments the schools receive (i.e. tuition plus voucher)
this implies that the school expenditure remains fairly constant. The private schools
have identified a value of school expenditure close to $10,000 to be maximizing student
utility and try to keep this value constant throughout all voucher levels. Notice also that
initially in the case of no voucher, the tuition level is higher in the unequal distribution.
The intuition behind this is that in the case of an unequal income distribution, the
private schools have a higher portion of high income families whose preferences they are
catering to. Since high income families have a higher willingness to pay for a better
education this leads to an increased tuition.
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Figure 3.2: Expenditure per student(a) and Expenditure per low income student(b)
Both results, the increased expenditure of public schools and the constant expenditure of
private schools imply that the aggregate educational expenditure increases through the
introduction of the vouchers. This overall increase in the expenses valued by students
can be seen in both panels of Figure 3.2. In both distributions the expenditure per
student increases with the voucher introduction, while the expenditure per student in the
unequal distribution increases slower than the equal distribution. This can be explained
by the fact that in the equal distribution there are more students close to the threshold
of switching from public to private, i.e. as the voucher is introduced more students
switch from public to private in the equal distribution thus rendering a higher number
of students in private schools (which have higher educational expenditure).
This increase is also present with low income families, as depicted in the right panel of
Figure 3.2, which is partly due to the increased expenditure e0 by public schools (low
income students are mostly enrolled in public schools) and partly due to the increased
enrollment of students in private schools.27 These findings support the argument that
the introduction of the voucher system will increase the overall expenditure per student
in the district due to more students being able to afford private schools and the public
schools reacting to the increased pressure.
The next aspect of the introduction of a voucher system which deserves special atten-
tion is the distribution of students between public and private schools. Throughout
all distributions we can observe that the fraction of students enrolling in public school
decreases with the introduction of the voucher, see Figure 3.3, left panel, and conse-
quently, increases in private schools. Observe also, that in the initial case without a
27Both effects can be separated by switching the objective function of the public schools to one which
maximizes enrollment instead of surplus, then schools always set expenditure to the maximum possible
amount of v0 and thus one can measure the change in educational expenses solely attributed to an
increase in private school enrollment.
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Figure 3.3: Enrollment in Public Schools(a) and Composition of public schools(b)
voucher, there are more students enrolled in public school in the equal distribution, due
to the higher quality of public schools in this setting. Since public schools have a higher
expenditure per student in the equal distribution, more students find them attractive.
As the voucher increases, the number of students enrolled in public school get closer for
both distributions. However, low income students are mostly not among the students
who are actually able to afford to switch to private schools and thus are usually staying
in the public schools. In the right panel of Figure 3.3 we can see the enrollment in the
public school sector as a function of income class for all three voucher levels. You can
see that with rising income, the fraction of students enrolled in public school decreases,
which does not change with the introduction of the voucher. You can also see that the
largest difference between the voucher levels is for the income classes two and three.
These are the classes closest to the income threshold where switching to private school
is most likely, holding all other household characteristics constant. These two classes
are the ones with the highest proportion of school changers and thus profit from the
voucher the most in this regard. For the lowest income class the number of students
exercising choice remains close to 20 %, i.e. only a small fraction of the low income
students are actually exercising choice at the highest voucher level of $4000. We can
thus conclude, that not all income classes do profit equally from the voucher, i.e. es-
pecially low income students are usually staying behind in the public schools and their
benefits from a voucher program are closely correlated to the effect on public school
expenditure. As shown above, public schools increase their expenditure which leads to
an increase in the educational quality experienced by the students. The other aspect
affecting the educational experience of students is the quality of peers, i.e. mean ability
in the respective school.
Figure 3.4 depicts the mean ability in the public sector (left panel) vs. private sector
(right panel) in the equal and the unequal distribution, respectively. In both school
systems we can observe a decline in mean ability. This somewhat counterintiuitive
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result can be explained if one looks at the type of students most likely to exercise choice
in public schools, namely the high ability students. As they leave the public schools,
mean ability falls, however they are on average at the lower end of the ability spectrum
in private schools and thus diminish mean ability as they enter private schools. The
decline for the public schools implies that the students staying behind in the public
school are observing a decline in their peer group.
Now comparing the mean ability levels for both distributions we can see that the mean
ability in the public schools is higher in the equal distribution before the voucher is
introduced. Analogously to the higher educational quality in the equal distribution as
explained above, this is the result of the public school sector being of higher quality in
terms of educational expenditure. The higher expenditure per student attracts students
which put higher weight on the educational expenditure, which are the ones with higher
ability levels. However, due to the higher number of students switching schools in the
equal distribution when the voucher is introduced, we can observe a stronger decline of
ability in the public schools as it is mostly the high ability students who are exercising
choice. This also explains how in the private school sector we can observe a stronger
decline in mean ability in the equal distribution case. As more students switch from
public to private, this lowers the mean ability since the high ability students from public
schools are on the lower end of the ability spectrum in the private schools. We can
thus conclude that there is an ambiguous effect on the educational attainment, ai =
a(ms, es), of students from the lower income groups. While the ones switching schools
experience improved educational outcomes, the ones staying back are exposed to two
effects. First, the educational expenses by public schools, e0 increase and thus improve
their educational experience. However, at the same time, as the peer group in public
schools deteriorates, i.e. ms declines, public school students have worse outcomes in
this regard. This result is in line with findings from Manski (1992), Epple and Romano
(1998), Epple and Romano (2008). As the universal voucher program discussed so far
fails to increase both arguments of the educational attainment of students, it remains of
interest whether an alternative program such as a target voucher system would be able
to do so.
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Figure 3.4: Average Ability Public Schools(a) and Mean Ability Private Schools(b)
3.4.2 Universal Vouchers- Varying Income Distribution
In addition to the comparison between the equal and unequal income conducted in
section 3.4.1 this section compares outcomes for a universal voucher for two different
distribution of ability. Analogous to the two income distributions, in this section I use
two distributions for ability, equal and unequal. In particular, for the equal distribution
all students have an ability b which has a uniform distribution on its support, Sb =
[40, 60]28, whereas the unequal distribution ability has a uniform distribution on its
support, Sb = [0, 100]. Family income y has a uniform distribution on its support
Sy = [0, 100] (where y is denoted in multiples of one thousand). The motivation behind
this analysis is to see how far the problem of “cream skimming” is pervasive to this
alternative setting where ability is not heterogeneous anymore. Walsh (2009) shows
that “cream skimming” is very unlikely to be a concern when public schools exhibit
very low levels of heterogeneity, i.e. the peer effects caused by vouchers would have to
be unrealistically high to give any rise to concern of a deteriorating peer group.29 Figure
3.3 in section 3.4.1 gives an indication of this lack of heterogeneity, as the student body
within public schools consists to a large degree of low income families. Figure 3.5 shows
how the results for the case of an equal distribution of ability are similar to the results
in section 3.4.1 with regard toeh public school expenditure and private school tuition.
As in the case for the equal income distribution, equality of ability has a positive effect
on the overall enrollment in public school as can be seen in Figure 3.7, due to the higher
quality of public schools in this setting. Since public schools have a higher expenditure
per student in the equal distribution, more students find them attractive. Also, similar
to the previous comparison between equal and unequal income comparison, again the
28In order to check for robustness, I have also implemented a number of alternative ’equal distribu-
tions’, including a case where all students have an ability b = 50, the results in all of these cases were
similar to the one reported here
29I would like to thank an anonymous referee for encouraging this alternative specification
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0
5
10
15
20
Ex
pe
nd
itu
re
voucher=0 voucher=2 voucher=4
by Voucher Level
Expenditure per Student
Unequal Ability Distr Equal Ability Distr
0
2
4
6
8
Ex
pe
nd
itu
re
voucher=0 voucher=2 voucher=4
by Voucher Level
Expenditure per Student Low
(a) (b)
Figure 3.6: Expenditure per student(a) and Expenditure per low income student(b)
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Figure 3.7: Enrollment in Public Schools(a) and Composition of public schools(b)
low income students are mostly not among the students who are actually able to afford
to switch to private schools and thus are usually staying in the public schools, as can be
seen in the right panel of Figure 3.7.
With rising income, the fraction of students enrolled in public school decreases again,
which does not change with the introduction of the voucher. The largest difference
between the voucher levels is for the income classes two and three as those are the classes
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Figure 3.8: Mean Ability Public Schools(a) and Mean Ability Private Schools(b)
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Figure 3.9: Mean Ability Public(a) Schools and Mean Ability Private Schools(b)
closest to the income threshold where switching to private school is financially feasible,
holding all other household characteristics constant. Thus, as before we can conclude,
that not all income classes do profit equally from the voucher, i.e. especially low income
students are still not able to afford the switch to private school. Meanwhile, due to
the increased expenditure of public schools under the voucher system, the students who
remain in the public schools experience only a beneficial effect in this setting. Unlike
the comparison in section 3.4.1, here we do not have any decrease in Mean Ability in the
public schools due to the homogeneous distribution of ability, i.e. mean ability remains
almost constant through the voucher levels or only slightly decreases. Thus similar to
Walsh (2009), the phenomenon of “cream skimming” is not observable for such a small
degree of heterogeneity in ability.
In addition, Figure 3.9 plots the same results under a more heterogeneous distribution
of ability, i.e. b is uniformly distribution on its support Sb = [20, 80]. Even here, the
“cream skimming” effect appears to be more nuanced compared to section 3.4.1. Finally,
the results for target vouchers under this homogeneous distribution of ability continue
to hold and are very similar to section 3.5 and are not reported here.
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3.5 Target Vouchers
In this section, I present the simulation results from a target voucher policy that allows
the voucher to vary with student characteristics. The main target of such an alterna-
tive voucher program would be to avoid stratification or cream skimming, which was the
result of the universal voucher system discussed above under the assumption of heteroge-
neous student ability.30 For this purpose, I examine a target voucher system that allows
the voucher to vary with household characteristics ability and income, i.e. v = v(b, y).
Target voucher systems have been discussed in simulation models by Nechyba (2000)
and Caucutt (2002), who analyze the effect of targeting vouchers to income of the re-
cipients. Epple and Romano (2008) alternatively examine the effects of a voucher that
is a function of the ability of students in a general equilibrium model. Here, I examine
both voucher alternatives, using a functional form that allows for the average voucher
level to remain close to the universal voucher level. The functional form implies that for
the student with either average family income or Mean Ability level the voucher level
remains the same, while the students above or below the mean are affected.
The targeted vouchers I examine are of the following two functional forms for income
and ability, respectively:
vi(yi) = v0 +
v0
100
(y¯ − yi) (3.12a)
vi(bi) = v0 +
v0
100
(b¯− bi) (3.12b)
where v0 can take three values, namely 0, $2000, and $4000. Notice that with the
functional form of equations (3.12a) and (3.12b), the average voucher given to students
remains the same and only the distribution and the maximum voucher level changes.
Both voucher programs allow to subsidize students that are below the overall mean
ability, b¯ or below the overall mean income, y¯, that is, these students receive a voucher
higher than the average voucher v0, with the students at the lower end of the spectrum
receiving the highest possible voucher (e.g. for yi = 0 or bi = 0, we have v1 = 4
or v1 = 8). Meanwhile students above b¯ or y¯ receive a voucher gradually lower than
v0 with the students at the upper end of the spectrum receiving no voucher (e.g. for
yi = 100 or bi = 100, v0 = 0).
31 All of the policy experiments reported below are with
an unequal distribution of income as used in the previous section, i.e. all classes contain
20% of families (Gini coefficient: 0.33).
30The finding presented in this section were also conducted under the assumption of heterogeneous
distributions of ability and yielded similar results.
31This is contrary to the analysis in Fu (2014) who allows for vouchers to be positively correlated with
ability.
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Figure 3.10: Public School Expenditure(a) and Private School Tuition(b)
The first finding of this section is that the key results of the previous section for the
variables private school tuition, public school expenditure, and overall expenditure reveal
very similar patterns in the target voucher case compared to the universal vouchers.
All graphs below contain the universal voucher from the previous section for ease of
comparison. I briefly describe the outcomes for all three variables. Figure 3.10, left
panel shows how public schools exhibit a similar behavior to the universal case, i.e. an
increase in expenditure follows the introduction of the voucher. Private school tuition
still falls in the two target voucher settings compared to the universal voucher by a value
close to the voucher level, which in turn implies that again throughout all voucher levels,
the expenditure in private schools remains constant, see right panel Figure 3.10.
As we look to the results in Figure 3.11, we can see that expenditure per student also
develops similar to the universal voucher program, that is we can observe an increase in
the expenditure per student by students. This also holds for the case of the expenditure
per student for low income students. Notice that here, the effect is most pronounced
in the case of v1 = 8, as this specifically supports the low income students ability to
switch schools. The enrollment patterns in both school systems also show a very similar
development in the target and universal voucher case and are thus omitted here and left
to the Appendix.
The second finding from this section is that one form of the target voucher, namely the
ability voucher is actually able to reverse the negative peer effect, which we observed in
the case of the universal voucher due to “cream skimming”. Figure 3.12 plots the mean
ability in public (left panel) and private schools (right panel). Mean ability falls in all
voucher programs in the private school. For public schools we only observe a decrease
in mean ability for the universal vouchers and the income voucher. The ability voucher,
however, actually leads to an increase in the mean ability in public schools. This is
caused by the incentive scheme that the ability voucher entails. The voucher amount
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Figure 3.11: Expenditure per student(a) and Expenditure per low income student(b)
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Figure 3.12: Mean Ability Public Schools(a) and Mean Ability Private Schools(b)
is negatively correlated with the students’ ability, i.e students with high ability obtain
less voucher amounts than students with low ability. This reverses the incentives of high
ability students who naturally put more weight on educational quality as is and thus
are more likely to prefer private over public schooling. Unlike the universal voucher and
the income voucher which do not consider the ability level, the ability voucher is able
to circumvent the deterioration of the peer group (or to even slightly reverse it).
The target voucher thus allows to obtain the benefits of school competition without
leading to detrimental outcomes for some students especially in the lower income groups.
This finding suggests that a careful design of a voucher program would allow to reap
the benefits of more competition (through an increase in productivity of public schools)
while avoiding detrimental peer group effects.
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3.6 Robustness Analysis
In order to ensure that the results obtained in the previous sections are robust, a series
of robustness tests were run. Hereby, I focused on the main results, namely the increased
public school expenditure and the peer group effect on public schools, i.e. whether the
ability voucher system was indeed the only policy where the negative outcomes could
be avoided. To this end, I first ran a number of combinations of parameter values for
the EWA model. In particular, I systematically varied each of the parameters by small
increments, ρ, φ, δ, λ to test whether the learning still took place in the same manner.
None of the variations yielded substantial changes to the results. In a next step, I grad-
ually changed the parameters of the utility functions of the agents, i.e. the boundaries
of α, β, and γ were either increased or decreased by small amounts to adjust the opti-
mal amount that a family would like to spend on tuition without a change in the key
results. In a next step, instead of recording results after 1,000 iterations I increased the
number of steps to 3000 in steps of 500. Then, both policy variables universal vouchers
and target vouchers were varied. First, I increased the highest universal voucher level
of $4000 in increments of $500 up to $8000 without a change in key parameters. The
same variations were run on the target voucher, where the value of v0 was adjusted in
the same vein. Another variation included the relaxation of distributional assumptions
regarding income, by allowing for a Dagum Distribution (see (Dagum, 1975)) income
which is positively skewed with mean larger then median. Finally, I relaxed the as-
sumption that ability and income are independently distributed and instead allowed for
various degree of correlation between those. In all of the performed variations the key
results of a constant or increasing peer group in the public schools and an increased
public school expenditure did not change.
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3.7 Conclusion
I developed an agent-based model drawing on Manski (1992) and Epple and Romano
(1998, 2008) and extended those models to study the distributional effects of a voucher
program while incorporating the endogenous reaction of public and private schools to
the voucher program. The model shows how the public school sector reacts with an
increase in educational expenditure to the increased competition and thereby renders a
positive educational outcome for students who remain in these schools in this regard. In
particular, the paper shows that public schools increase their expenditure per student
(public school rents fall) under a voucher system, adding to an overall increase in expen-
diture per student and thus leading to an increase in efficiency. However, students who
remain in public school are exposed to a decline in peer group quality due to students
with higher abilities or higher income are exercising choice with a higher probability.
The model simulates this change in the student body, i.e. students exercising choice are
either of high ability or from high income families. Thus, a universal voucher program
aggravates the existing stratification within the school system.
In a further step, I have extended the model to allow for a targeted voucher program
which allows to make the voucher a function of income or ability. Similar to Epple and
Romano (2008) I examine the effects of these alternate voucher programs and find that
only the ability targeted voucher is able to avoid the peer deterioration and even reverse
it while still maintaining the increase in the educational expenditure of public schools.
Thus, the ability voucher is able to introduce competition into educational system while
avoiding the negative effects of of universal vouchers. That is, the ability targeted
voucher is able to increase the educational expenditure of public schools while at the
same time preventing a deterioration of peer quality (e.g. cream skimming). This comes,
at a less stringent set of restrictions for public and private schools, i.e. allowing public
schools to react to higher degrees of competition and while allowing private schools to
set the tuition level above the voucher level. Thus, using such a voucher program would
allow to avoid the negative effect of a voucher program on students from low income
families and students with lower ability.
Another important caveat to these findings is that, in general when examining school
performance and student outcomes, the expenditure of schools is only an imperfect
proxy for the productivity of the school (or its ability to provide a valuable education
to students). While the findings in this paper show that public school performance as
measured through expenditure is improving, in the sense that the schools are exerting
more ”monetary effort”, a number of empirical studies (see (Hoxby, 2003b)) find that
increased competition leads to public school students’ achievement rising significantly
and rapidly while keeping spending in the schools unaffected, i.e. public schools increase
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the ”non-monetary effort”. The model employed in this paper does not feature non-
monetary efforts, i.e. the public schools in the model can only improve by increasing
expenditure as this is the variable noticed by students, thus the effect of competition
on public schools is observed via the expenditure channel. Yet, the findings in the
model are still in line with these empirical observations to a certain degree as the public
schools are using the funds already available to them in order to finance the increased
funding, i.e. they are reducing their surplus and do not receive additional funds. In
this sense the public schools are offering a better education to their students without
requiring additional funding (or becoming more efficient by using the funds available
to them). This result hinges on the assumption, that the public schools are indeed
local monopolists and as such are able to accumulate surpluses while the private schools
have zero economic profit due the competition they are exposed to. Given that a large
fraction of students per school district default into public school and cannot choose their
schools, this appears to be in line with what is observed empirically.
The effects of an introduction of a voucher based school system is still the subject of much
debate but these results indicate that the educational outcomes of voucher programs are
strongly influenced by the voucher design and a careful design could reduce the chances
of further stratification.
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3.8 Appendix
3.8.1 Calibration
Given that for private schools (s = 1) expenditure equals, es = vs + ts the derivative of
the student utility function with respect to tuition is:
∂Uis
∂ts
=
αi
ts + vis
− γ
yi − ts + vis (3.13)
For vis = 0, this implies that in the optimum, households want to spend
α
α+ γ
of their
income on education, or utility rises with tuition until tuition is optimal, namely (solving
the equation above for t1, after setting it equal to zero):
t1 =
α
α+ γ
yi (3.14)
For the given calibration this would mean that students at the upper end of the ability
and income spectrum, i.e. α = 5 and γ = 25, are willing to spend 1/6 of their family
income in optimum.
3.8.2 Additional Simulation Results
Figure 3.13 plots a similarly decreasing enrollment in all voucher programs as the voucher
level increases. The upper right panel and the lower panels display the switching pattern
by income class as in the previous chapter. The upper right panel with the universal
voucher is reproduced for comparison. The lower left panel shows the composition for
ability voucher which displays a very similar development as the universal voucher, i.e.
again the lowest class is merely exercising choice wile the classes two and three are the
ones mostly switching schools. The lower right panel displays the composition for the
income voucher, which unlike the two other programs display a very large number of
low income students exercising choice.
Figure 3.14 plots the development of costs throughout the voucher programs. We can
see that government costs per student increase from an average value of around $ 4000
to $ 4500. Overall cost of families remains stable while costs for low income families
increase since they start to attend private schools in higher numbers now.
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Figure 3.13: Public school enrollment and composition
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Chapter 4
A Tradable Employment Quota1
4.1 Introduction
Affirmative action policies very often take the form of employment quotas. Norway
introduced a quota in 2003 already. France, Iceland, and Spain have mandatory board-
room gender quotas forcing firms to have boards with 40% women by the years 2017,
2013, and 2015, respectively. German publicly listed firms subject to co-determination
have to comply to a boardroom quota of 30% from 2016 onwards. Furthermore, the
European Parliament passed a proposal by the European Commission to break the glass
ceiling. According to this envisaged bill, European firms have to appoint female directors
in order to make supervisory boards two-fifths female by 2020.2
As it is very likely that a uniform employment quota imposes larger adjustment costs
on some firms than on others the question arises whether the goal of paving the way
for more female employment can be achieved at lower costs. In particular, as the size
of women’s labor supply is heterogeneous across occupations, sectors, and regions, some
of the firms forced to fulfill a fixed quota will find it more difficult to hire women who
match the vacancies than others. A more flexible instrument is called for that does
not compromise on the overall goal of achieving a certain share of female employment.
Such an instrument should allow firms to fall short of the quota if costs of compliance
would become unreasonable, while allowing others to gain from employing relatively
more women.
In this article we propose and analyze the labor market effects of a tradable employment
quota. Borrowing from the experience with environmental regulation policies to combat
excessive emissions, we suggest to implement a mechanism that efficiently achieves a
1This Chapter is based on Akyol et al. (2015)
2See the European Commission Database on Women and Men in Decision Making.
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fixed share of women working in relation to men. The idea is to issue permits to firms
that give them the right to employ men and make these permits tradable. With such an
affirmative action policy firms would only be allowed to employ men up to a number that
matches the stock of permits that they hold. As a particular firm wants to employ an
additional man it would only be able to do so by purchasing an additional employment
right. Firms being in excess of permits because they find it more profitable to employ
a woman than to hold a permit will want to sell this right. Trading of permits between
those firms that want to buy and those firms willing to sell would yield a market price of
a permit reflecting the profitability of employing an additional man. While the overall
supply of permits of an issuing body would determine the share of female employment
in the economy, single firms could adjust more flexibly and still comply.
We are aware of the fact that very often economists’ ideas for resolving societal issues
do not find widespread support outside of their own community. Sometimes even fierce
opposition arises and we would not be surprised if such a reaction emerges as a response
to our proposal. The public discussion of affirmative action policies is very much centered
on equity considerations. It appears to us that efficiency or the loss of efficiency is
of secondary importance, maybe because policymakers or those whom they represent
are not willing to trade equity for efficiency. On this background we believe that it
is important to stress that our proposal does not question the equity related aim of
improving women’s participation in the labor market. Personally, we also think that
this should be an important goal for policymakers. What we suggest here is, however, a
policy measure that has the potential to achieve equity at a lower cost for society. The
way that this may be achieved is via a market-oriented instrument.
We expect that recurring to market mechanisms to resolve equity issues may become
another reason why our proposal could be dismissed by the broader public upfront. In
fact, it has been reported that initially there was heavy opposition to the introduction of
tradable carbon dioxide emission rights coming from environmental groups. The hostil-
ity towards a marked-oriented instrument was mostly driven by moral or philosophical
reasoning where it was argued that “It’s Immoral to Buy the Right to Pollute” as the
New York Times titled an article.3 Similar objections may arise with respect to our
proposal. Some critics may claim that it is immoral that firms can buy themselves out
of the obligation to hire women by purchasing permits that allow them to employ men
rather than women. We find it very difficult to resolve such kind of moral concerns. But
we would like to point to a more recent discussion that has arisen as employment quotas
got implemented. There is evidence that women feel stigmatized when their employer is
subject to a quota (Heilman et al., 1992, 1997). The unease comes from the perception
that fellow employees may think that a particular woman was only employed because of
3See Sandel (1997).
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the quota policy rather than because of her qualification. Interestingly, in our proposal
such a stigma is less likely to emerge because the mere fact that the employer chose to
offer a contract to a woman signals appreciation. Alternatively, the employer could have
employed a man by not selling a permit or buying an additional permit (which he did
not do.)
In the context of environmental policies the use of tradable permits is based on Ronald
Coase’s idea that market participants may correct for negative externalities without
the intervention of governments if legal rules of entitlement exist and transaction costs
are negligible (Coase, 1960). Negative externalities which are arising from production
through the emission of health and climate damaging gases are corrected for by giving
firms the right to pollute (or those affected by the emission the right for unpolluted air).
Consequently, emissions are only allowed if costly permits are held so that firms are con-
fronted with the socially relevant marginal costs of production rather than their private
marginal costs only. It follows that production is extended up to the socially desirable
level only. Moreover, the abatement of (environmentally) unhealthy substances takes
place at the lowest costs possible. Those firms with relatively low marginal abatement
costs will choose to invest in clean technologies and sell their permits, whereas the firms
with relatively high marginal abatement costs will want to expand production by pur-
chasing permits. It is the cost reducing feature of permit trading which we borrow for
developing our proposal of an affirmative action policy that increases female employment
shares at relatively lower costs than one would have with a uniform quota. As in the
case of environmental policies, we expect that those firms which will find it inherently
difficult to hire women will rather purchase permits than leave vacancies unproductive or
costly retrain their newly hired employees, whereas those firms able to hire women will
sell their permits. All these cost saving decisions of firms leading to trades on the permit
market, however, should not jeopardize the goal of achieving an overall female employ-
ment rate set by policymakers and implemented by issuing a corresponding number of
tradable employment permits.4
We would like to give some empirical evidence on the current situation with respect to
female participation in advisory and executive boards of mostly publicly listed firms.
Restricting to these figures for illustrative purposes may be justified by the recent policy
moves that started to regulate this particular part of the labor market. With 16% the
4We have been asked at various occasions whether our case of a discriminatory labor market entails
some form of externality, which is then resolved through our proposed permit solution. In the sense
that an externality is present whenever some economic agent’s welfare is directly affected by the action
of another agent (see, e.g., Hindriks and Myles, 2013) a discriminating firm does not constitute an
externality. Choices of discriminating firms have effects on other agents’ payoffs but they are mediated
by prices, i.e. they are indirect or so-called pecuniary externalities. Thus, it is not an externatility that
we correct for with tradable employment rights, but we rather target the heterogeneous adjustment costs
of firms that can be handled more efficiently through our proposal.
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U.S. and the 27 (by 2007) EU member states fare equally in terms of female representa-
tion on firm boards. Japan, as another major industrialized country, has only 1% women
on firm boards. A closer look into single European countries reveals a large dispersion
of female representation. In the three countries with the largest representation almost
every third member is female, a share which, however, still falls short of Norway where
a quota was introduced in 2003 already, forcing firms to comply by 2008. In the Euro-
pean countries that do worst less than one tenth of the positions are held by women.
Interestingly, the countries doing relatively well in terms of female board membership
hardly have women leading the board or being a CEO. Data for Germany allows for a
closer look into the within country distribution of female representation. Again, we find
a large variance between firms. Among the companies listed in the DAX (the major
German stock market index), seven women served on the board of Henkel (a company
producing personal care products) which was composed of 16 members at the time of
data collection, while no woman was serving on the board of Fresenius (a medical care
company).5
The introduction of a female board quota in Norway constituted a natural experiment
that allowed for an analysis of firm reactions and their consequences more closely. At the
time the law was introduced only 9% of women were on the boards of Norwegian firms.
A legislated quota of 40% imposed a major change on the composition of Norwegian firm
boards. Ahern and Dittmar (2012) use the pre-quota female representation across firms
as an instrument for the changes of boards that followed the quota. For the days around
the announcement of the law they find that stock returns fell by 3.52% for those firms
with no female representation compared to firms that had at least one woman on the
board. For the longer term, they estimate a decline in Tobin’s Q of 12.4% as a response
to a 10% forced increase in women representation on the boards. Overall they conclude
that the imposed constraint had a large negative impact on firm value driven by the
reorganizations of the boards. Drawing on the same policy change, Bohren and Staubo
(2014) find that half of the firms that would have been affected by the gender quota
chose to exit into another organizational form, thus avoiding exposition to the law. Also
this piece of evidence suggests, at least indirectly, substantial costs of compliance that
possibly could be diminished with a system of tradable permits to employ men.
In order to study whether a tradable employment quota is a feasible affirmative action
policy and what labor market effects would possibly unfold we build a model that hosts
a labor market and a market for permits. We study a labor market with a set of firms
being allocated to multiple sectors. A fraction of the firms is characterized by taste
discrimination against women as proposed by Becker (1957). The remaining fraction of
5A table summarizing these figures and some additional information can be found in the Appendix
(see Table 4.7).
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firms is indifferent between hiring men and women. Workers have sector specific skills
meaning that their productivity does not fully unfold unless they work in a sector that
requires precisely those skills. Female labor supply to sectors varies with the share of
discriminating firms. In the words of Bergmann (1974) we assume “overcrowding” as
firms systematically exclude women due to their distaste which ultimately leads to fewer
women having invested in skills demanded by those firms. Firms post vacancies to which
workers apply and are matched. In this framework taste discrimination leads to worse
employment chances for women and lower wages. In order to balance this resulting
gender gap we compare the labor market effects of two policies by studying the effects
of a tradable as opposed to a non-tradable employment quota on welfare and various
other labor market indicators.
Our main finding is that a tradable employment quota fares better in a heterogeneous
labor market where firms are facing differentiated levels of female labor supply. The
intuition why the tradable quota is superior is that given the heterogeneous labor supply
of women, the degree to which firms are affected by a non-tradable quota varies, i.e. while
firms residing in sectors with many women find it very easy to comply, the ones in sectors
with less women find it more difficult. The tradable quota is a remedy for exactly this
difference. It allows those firms facing high costs that would arise from a uniform quota
to evade these costs by buying permits from those companies having an excess supply of
permits because of the relatively higher labor supply of women to them. In a simulated
version of our model we can disentangle the welfare effect of a tradable employment
quota into changes of payoffs to firms and the wage sum and, furthermore, show how
wages and payoffs change in discriminating and non-discriminating firms. This analysis
shows that the advantage of the quota is mainly due to the fact that the tradable quota
is a more flexible instrument and therefore better able to deal with an unequal female
labour supply and discriminatory firms present in the market, without falling short of
the equity goal of increasing female employment.
We analyze a simplified version of the model analytically and transpose a richer version
of our framework into an agent-based simulation model to analyze whether a permit
solution may actually work and what labor market effects might potentially emerge.
Evaluating labor market policies using agent-based models has been suggested by Free-
man (1998) already some time ago. Generally speaking an agent-based approach suits
well for analyzing problems characterized by interacting heterogeneous agents. More-
over, agent-based modeling allows for a relatively detailed implementation of institu-
tional arrangements. As we build a model with a sectoral structure hosting workers
of different skill types to be employed by firms that may discriminate against women
and, furthermore, will augment the labor market with a permit trading system, the
agent-based approach seems to suit well for our purposes. Our approach may also be
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subsumed under what Roth (2002, p.1341) called “design economics” where he argues
that computational techniques should be seen as complementary to other tools applied
to studying and designing markets, namely game-theory. One of the earliest attempts
to analyze the effects of labor market institutions in an agent-based model can be found
in Bergmann (1990). Others followed, with Tesfatsion (2001) working on wage setting
or Neugart (2008) looking into training policies. Those and other contributions are
surveyed in Neugart and Richiardi (2015).
Building our model we touch upon various strands of the literature. Women’s wages, em-
ployment opportunities or occupations may be affected by labor market discrimination
in various ways. Becker (1957) suggested that men and women being treated differ-
ently can be explained by taste discriminating firms. A second, alternative explanation,
is statistical discrimination (Arrow, 1973; Phelps, 1972) which postulates that employ-
ers discriminate on the basis of expected differences in average productivity between
men and women. Empirical work long evolved separately along these two explanations
(Guryan and Charles, 2013). Only in recent years efforts have been made to test taste
based explanations of discrimination against explanations pointing at statistical dis-
crimination (See, e.g., Altonji and Pierret, 2001; Knowles et al., 2001). The jury still
seems to be out and we do not make an attempt to resolve the issue here. Finally, a
third explanation, typically referred to as “occupational crowding” argues that women
are systematically excluded from “male jobs” (Bergmann, 1974). The origins of over-
crowding may lie in a social climate where young women are told that some jobs are
not suitable for “girls” or discrimination might already take place at the stage of human
capital acquisition (Mechtenberg, 2009). But it may also be the results of a feedback
from the discriminatory behavior of firms that offer worse pay and job conditions (Blau
and Kahn, 2000, p. 82) or the expected lower likelihood to get a top position (Stark and
Hyll, 2014) leading to a deliberate decision by women not to invest into skills demanded
by those discriminating firms. Drafting our model to analyze policies we heavily draw
on the idea of taste discriminating firms and the feedback arising with respect to labor
supply decisions by women.
Welch (1976) was probably among the first dealing with affirmative action policies from
a theoretical point of view. One concern was to elaborate the consequences of a quota
arising from skill bumping, i.e. the upgrading of skills of workers so that firms would
comply to the affirmative action policy. Equal employment opportunities as one pro-
liferation of affirmative action policies have been studied in the framework of a search
and matching model of the labor market by Kaas and Lu (2010). They find that if an
imperfectly monitored equal employment opportunity legislation is combined with an
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equal pay obligation inequality increases.6 Contrary to them we do not look into a fixed
quota but a tradable one.
Tradable permits solutions have gained widespread attention in the area of environ-
mental policies (see, e.g., Stavins, 1998), but were also proposed as alternative policy
instruments in the context of debt policies in the European Union (Casella, 1999), immi-
gration (Moraga and Rapoport, 2014), birth control (De la Croix and Gosseries, 2009),
or noise control at airports (Bre´chet and Picard, 2010). With most of these proposals
as with our application welfare consequences remain a theoretical discussion because
the policy instruments were hardly implemented. The exceptions are, of course, the
permit markets for carbon dioxide and sulfur dioxide. According to Schmalensee and
Stavins (2013) these policy experiments mostly achieved the cost reducing goals. It is
claimed that cost savings were at least 15 percent and perhaps even up to 90 percent
compared with command-and-control approaches. While tradable permit solutions have
been applied to other policy areas, there is, however, little to no work in the area of
labor market policies.7 This contribution may be seen as a first step into the analysis of
such kind of affirmative action policies.
In the following Section 4.2 we lay out our model and introduce the reader to the two
affirmative action policies we are going to compare. As a benchmark for the simulation
exercise we derive an analytical solution of a simplified version of our model with and
without policies in Section 4.3. In Section 4.4 we introduce the reader to the parametriza-
tion and the simulation set-up. In Section 4.5 we present our results on the effects of
a tradable employment quota in comparison with a non-tradable quota on welfare and
other labor market indicators, and also report on various robustness tests. In the last
section we conclude, discuss our proposal in relation to other policies, and point toward
possible extensions.
4.2 The Model
4.2.1 A General Description
Our model consists of a labor market with heterogeneous firms, male and female workers,
and a permit market. The labor market has a sectoral structure where the sectors hosting
6Other contributions looking into the labor market consequences of equal pay legislation are Bowlus
and Eckstein (2002); Coate and Loury (1993); Kaas (2009). Further search and matching models with
taste discrimination but without policy analyses can be found in Black (1995); Lang et al. (2005); Rosen
(2003).
7Winker (2000) sketches the idea of how collective wage agreements could be made more flexible
using tradable permits.
Chapter 4. Tradable Employment Quota 46
the firms are allocated on a Salop circle (Salop, 1979), and the share of female workers
differs in sectors.8
Firms sitting in a particular sector have distinct skill needs. Workers are equipped with
different sector specific skills. A worker’s productivity unfolds fully if she is employed
in a sector that matches her skills. Workers employed by firms in other sectors lose part
of their productivity. Labor demand for each firm is fixed. Vacancies are posted and
workers apply.
A fixed share of firms discriminates against women. Due to taste discrimination these
firms will only employ women instead of men if wages of the former are sufficiently lower
(or productivity is sufficiently higher). As a consequence of the taste discriminating firms
and in accordance with theories of discrimination related to “occupational crowding”
outlined earlier on, labor supply of women is modeled as being negatively correlated
with the share of discriminating firms in a sector.
Firms send non-binding wage offers to the applicants with highest profitability. Workers
know that the offer is not binding as the firm has to comply with an affirmative action
policy once all workers decided on which offer to accept (if any).
Specifically, we consider two affirmative action policies. Under a non-tradable employ-
ment quota every firm is allowed to only employ a share of men that does not exceed the
quota. Alternatively, we implement a tradable quota issuing permits that give a firm
the right to employ men.
Once a firm knows about the gender composition of applicants who accepted its offers,
it is able to determine the actual number of men it can employ (in relation to its female
workforce) to comply with a fixed quota, or in the case of a tradable quota, how many
permits it needs to purchase. Consequently, in both scenarios the affirmative action
policies magnify the problem of coordination failure giving rise to labor market frictions
(See, e.g. Petrongolo and Pissarides, 2001, sec. 3.2). Due to the policies, men may have
to be turned down and vacancies stay empty.
The permit market is modeled with a central market maker to whom each individual
firm submits its individual supply and demand schedule of permits. The central market
maker aggregates these bids and asks and determines the market clearing price at which
the permits are reallocated.
8The Salop model has been used as a framework for studying the effects of discrimination and labor
market policies with imperfect competition by others before. Examples are Bhaskar et al. (2002), Bhaskar
and To (2003), Kaas (2009), or Berson (2014). Contrary to the existing work we add tradable permits
to a model of imperfect competition with discriminating firms whereas many of our other modeling
assumptions are in line with respect to this strand of the literature.
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4.2.2 Labor Market Environment
We consider a partial labor market where firms’ fixed labor demand is derived from
aggregate product demand. Firms reside in s ∈ S sectors. Workers are equipped with
skills for a specific sector k but may be employed at a firm in a sector other than
k. A worker i employed at a firm in a sector requiring her specific skills unfolds full
productivity A. Worker specific productivity Pi(k, s) declines as she is employed in a
more distant sector. Sectors are allocated on a Salop circle, i.e. a worker’s productivity
with specific skills in sector k, working in sector s follows
Pi(k, s) =
A− a · |k − s| if |k − s| ≤ S/2A− a · (S − |k − s|) else, (4.1)
with 0 < a < 1, k = 1, ...,K, and s = 1, ..., S. As there are as many skill types as sectors
we have K = S.
4.2.3 Workers
The fixed total labor supply of size I can be decomposed into a fraction σ of female
workers and a fraction (1− σ) of male workers . The share of female labor supply may
differ between sectors according to σk. A worker i has an individual reservation wage
wri that is drawn from a uniform distribution with support [0, A] resulting in an upward
sloping labor market supply curve.
Workers send out a fixed number m (with m > 1) of applications preferably to firms
which value their sector specific skills. Unobservable characteristics orthogonal to work-
ers’ skill endowment make some sectors more attractive to a specific worker than others.
Thus, she may send an application to a firm in a sector which does not value her specific
skills most. More formally, we recur to a discrete choice specification postulating that
worker i with specific skills for sector k sends out an application to a firm in sector s˜
with probability
Probi(k, s˜) =
eλPi(k,s˜)∑
s e
λPi(k,s)
, (4.2)
where λ ≥ 0 drives the intensity of choice and the denominator sums up the exponential
of worker specific productivities in all sectors.
Workers accept job offers with attached wage offers above their reservation wage wri .
If a worker receives more than one job offer, she chooses the job offer with the highest
wage.
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4.2.4 Firms
There is a total of L firms which we denote with l = 1, ...L. A firm l has Jl vacancies
to fill. Each sector is populated with N firms. Overall, there is a share of µ > 0 of
discriminating firms. The share of discriminating firms may differ across sectors. We
denote the share of discriminating firms in a sector s with µs > 0. A discriminating
firm has a dis-utility from hiring a female worker which is modeled with a discrimination
coefficient d as suggested by Becker (1957). The firm l residing in sector s has payoffs
calculated as the sum of the productivity net of the wage and the discrimination cost
over all workers J˜l it finally employs:
pil,s =
∑
J˜l
(Pi(k, s)− dg,l − wl,k,g,s), (4.3)
where g = M,F is the gender of the worker. For discrimination costs we have dM =
dF = 0 for a non-discriminating firm and dF > 0 for a firm that discriminates against
an employed woman.
Firms set male and female wages to maximize payoffs. Job offers conditional on the
firm having to comply with the affirmative action policy are sent out including worker
specific wage offers.
A firm finding a wage that maximizes payoffs faces the following trade-off: higher wage
offers increase the likelihood that a vacancy can be filled and becomes productive. Higher
wage offers, however, also increase the wage bill and depress payoffs. Firms learn given
their past experience on payoffs and wage offers how to best place themselves on this
trade-off. To this end, each firm runs regressions of payoffs per job offer on the wage
offers of the past τ iterations. For a positively estimated slope coefficient βˆ, a firm l that
resides in sector s will adjust the wage offer wo for a worker coming from sector k and
of gender g upwards by  > 0 in iteration t with respect to the previous iteration t− 1.
For a negatively estimated slope coefficient the wage is adjusted downwards. Formally,
we have
wol,k,g,s,t =

wol,k,g,s,t−1 +  if βˆl,k,g,s,t > 0,
wol,k,g,s,t−1 −  if βˆl,k,g,s,t < 0,
wol,k,g,s,t−1 else.
(4.4)
Wage offers are adjusted if they are within bounds [0, A].
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4.2.5 Policies
We consider an affirmative action policy where every single firm has to employ at least
σ¯J˜l women where σ¯ is the quota and J˜l is the number of workers employed at a firm l. In
order to comply with the quota firms rank applicants by gender and payoffs. Again, the
firm will send offers – which are declared conditional on the firm being able to comply
with the quota – to the best workers taking into account the quota.
Alternatively, we simulate a market with permits for employing men. In this case, a firm
is only allowed to employ as many men as it holds permits for employing male workers.
There is a fixed number for permits C for the whole economy. Initially every firm gets
an equal share of the total number of permits. These permits can be sold and bought at
a central clearing agency. For the clearing agency, we consider a central market maker
who collects ask and bid prices, determines the market clearing price in every period
and reallocates the permits between the buying and selling firms.
If a firm owns permits, its offer curve for selling permits is constructed as follows. All
unused permits are offered at reservation price zero. The offer of that single firm increases
by one more permit at a price equal to the payoff of the least profitable male worker.
The second least profitable worker determines the price of yet an additional permit. As
we move to even more profitable workers the full schedule of the offer curve for that
particular firm is derived.
Turning to the demand side the central market maker looks into a single firm that will
ask for as many permits as there are more men employed than the firm holds permits
currently. Permits are used to employ the most profitable male workers in the firm. The
bid price for the first additional permit is the payoff of the most profitable male worker
for whom the firm does not yet have a permit. The bid price for the second additional
permit is the payoff of the second most profitable male worker for whom the firm does
not yet have a permit, and so on.
4.3 Analytical Solution
We solve a simplified version of the model analytically in order to pin down some of the
mechanisms which will underlie our simulation results that are going to be presented in
the later sections. To this end, we set the number of firms hosted by a single sector to
N = 1 and let workers only apply to the firm of the sector to which their skill endowment
fully matches. This implies setting m = 1, Prob(k, s˜) = 1, and P (k, s) = A. Essentially,
we eliminate the part of labor market frictions arising through coordination failure in
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Table 4.1: A firm’s profits without policies
wl φ(wl) pil ∆pil
0 1 2φ(wl)(A− wl) = 2A
A
J/2 2 4A− 8AJ 2A− 8AJ = 2A− 1J 8A(φ(wl)− 1)
2 AJ/2 3 6A− 24AJ 2A− 16AJ = 2A− 1J 8A(φ(wl)− 1)
... ... ... ...
(J/2− 3) AJ/2 J/2− 2 6A− 24AJ
(J/2− 2) AJ/2 J/2− 1 4A− 8AJ −2A+ 16AJ = −2A+ 1J 8A(φ(wl)− 1)
(J/2− 1) AJ/2 J/2 2A −2A+ 8AJ = −2A+ 1J 8A(φ(wl)− 1)
the process of applying and hiring of workers. For the moment we will also assume an
even number of sectors S and jobs J at each firm, and an equal number of male and
female workers σ = 0.5 in each sector summing up to J workers. Furthermore, for each
gender reservation wages are distributed according to [0, AJ/2 , 2
A
J/2 , ..., (J/2− 1) AJ/2 ]. We
denote with φ(w) male and female labor supply in a sector, respectively. Finally, we let
there be no taste discriminating firms in the market (µ = 0).
4.3.1 No Employment Quota
Labor supply for a firm l is upward sloping due to the distribution of reservation wages.
In this monopsonistic setting a firm l chooses as many workers, and posts wages accord-
ingly, to maximize profits. Let wl be the wage paid by a firm l, then we may write for
the firm’s profits
pil = 2φ(wl)(A− wl), (4.5)
i.e. a worker’s productivity A less the wage paid times φ(wl) male and φ(wl) female
workers.
Table 4.1 lists profits of a firm l (third column) as a function of the wage offer wl and
the corresponding labor supply φ(wl). The firm will offer higher wages and expand
production as long as profits are increasing in wages (∆pil > 0). This gives optimal
number of workers φ∗l ≡ φ(w∗l ) for firm l as a function of overall supply J , and optimal
wages w∗l picked from the distribution of reservation wages (such that the firm gets the
optimal number of workers φ∗l ). Total output Y in this economy becomes
Y = S · 2 · φ∗l ·A. (4.6)
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4.3.2 Employment Quota
What decisions will firms make if they are confronted with an employment quota that
forces them to have a workforce where every second worker is female? A firm l in sector
s still wants to have 2φ(w∗l ) vacancies filled and offers w
∗
l . It faces a labor supply of
φ(w∗l ) women and φ(w
∗
l ) men and complies to the quota. Overall output in this economy
is
Y ntq,eqFemDis = S · (φ∗l + φ∗l ) ·A = S · 2 · φ∗l ·A. (4.7)
Now, let us assume that women are not equally distributed over sectors S. Rather we
inquire a labor market in which all women are allocated to sectors s = 1, ..., S/2 and all
men to sectors s = S/2+1, .., S. Although being subject to an employment quota, firms
in “female” sectors will be able to fill all of their 2φ∗l profit maximizing jobs. Firms in
“male” sectors will produce nothing due to the constraint imposed by the employment
quota that half of the workforce has to be female. Output with an employment quota
becomes
Y ntq,UneqFemDis = S/2 · 2φ∗l ·A+ 0 = S · φ∗l ·A < Y ntq,eqFemDis. (4.8)
4.3.3 A Tradable Employment Quota
Alternatively to the non-tradable employment quota permits are issued that allow the
firms to employ men now. We keep the assumption of an unequal distribution of women
across sectors. In order to make a labor market with permits comparable to the one
discussed without policies we issue C = S · φ∗l permits which is the number of male
workers that all firms employed when maximizing profits. Initially, permits are equally
distributed among firms. Thus, each firm is endowed with φ∗l permits.
Firms in sectors s = 1, ..., S/2 that face a female labor supply only can run all jobs 2φ∗l
without using a single permit. For any permit price p ≥ 0 they will be willing to sell
their permits. Thus, overall supply of permits is S/2 · φ∗l .
Firms in sectors s = S/2 + 1, .., S, facing a male labor supply only, have to purchase
permits as they want to employ more men than they initially were allocated permits.
The profit function of a firm l in a “male” sector becomes
pil = φ(w
p
l )(A− wpl )− (φ(wpl )− φ(w∗l ))p if φ(wpl )− φ(w∗l ) > 0 (4.9)
where wpl is the wage paid by a firm l in a labor market with permits. The first part
of the profit function constitutes the revenues of workers net of wage costs. The second
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part gives the costs of the permits that have to be bought in addition to the initially
allocated number of permits.
Table 4.2 lists profits as a function of the permit price having substituted in the wage
that has to be paid by a firm to draw on a certain labor supply. The table is drawn
starting off with the wage w∗l as the firm will never want to employ more workers than
in the case where it did not face a permit requirement even if permits would be available
for free.
As two men have equal reservation wages, a firm offering a marginally higher wage wpl
will face a labor supply of two additional men. It may want to employ both of them
or only one of them. By comparing profits it can easily be shown that they will always
choose to employ two additional men as long as the product A net of the wage for the
marginal worker is larger than the permit price.
Comparing profits of the firm for a labor demand of φ(wpl ) = 2φ(w
∗
l ) rather than φ(w
p
l ) =
2φ(w∗l )− 2 yields an upper permit price for the firm to be willing to employ 2φ(w∗l ) of
A− (w∗l −
A
J/2
) > p+
A
J/2
φ(w∗l ). (4.10)
For the firm to employ 2φ(w∗l ) men the additional net product, i.e. the worker’s pro-
ductivity minus the wage to be paid has to cover the permit price plus the increase in
the wage bill arising from the fact that all currently employed have to also receive the
higher wage. As, moreover, the marginal profits are positive and increasing with lower
demands for labor, the firm will demand 2φ(w∗l ) workers if permit prices fulfill
p = A− (w∗l −
A
J/2
)− A
J/2
φ(w∗l ) > p. (4.11)
Thus, for prices 0 ≤ p < p an exchange of φ∗l permits between firms in “female” and
“male” sectors is mutually advantageous.9 Firms in the “male” sectors will be able to
purchase additionally needed permits to employ 2φ∗l men in total. With a permit market
output becomes
Y tq,UneqFemDis = S/2 · 2φ∗l ·A+ S/2 · 2φ∗l ·A = S · 2φ∗l ·A (4.12)
9p > 0 as it is equal to the marginal product which the firm faces as it chooses the optimal wage
without a policy constraint.
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4.3.4 Results
Comparing the output effects of the two policies gives
Y = Y tq,UneqFemDis > Y ntq,UneqFemDis. (4.13)
The tradable employment quota is the superior policy instrument to the non-tradable
quota when female labor supply is heterogeneous across sectors. Jobs that in male
sectors are not productive, due to the employment quota constraint imposed on the
firms there, turn productive as those firms can purchase permits that allow them to
employ men.
4.3.5 Why Move on with Simulations?
In a next step, one may ask what happens to output in comparison of the two policies
as we also allow for lower wage offers to women by discriminating firms, i.e. we have
µ > 0. Again, a strongly simplifying assumption may help to gain some intuition.
Assume that all discriminating firms would be located in the “male sectors” and the
non-discriminating firms in the “female sectors”. Then, we would have no wage effects
at all arising from the taste discrimination and results would stay the same. Obviously,
this particular assumption as the ones previously employed are very strong, perhaps
even too strong to derive robust claims on the allocative effects of a tradable employment
quota. A more realistic scenario is that a particular sector hosts discriminating and non-
discriminating firms. Wage offers and hiring decisions of the non-discriminating firms
will affect the discriminating firms and vice versa. Gender specific wages by the type of
firm will emerge as well as gender specific employment rates. Moreover, firms unable to
fill vacancies with workers fully matching their skill requirements will very likely start
searching for workers in more distant sectors although those workers do not fully match
in terms of their human capital endowment. As a consequence, the firms’ and workers’
decisions in a particular sector will have spill-overs on the labor market conditions of
workers and firms in the adjacent sectors. In the following sections we will study those
interrelated decisions and simulate the outcomes of the more general model introduced
in Section 4.2. The intuition derived on the basis of the simplified model will help us to
better understand the findings of the more general case.
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4.4 Simulation Set-Up
4.4.1 Sequencing
The pseudocode outlined in Algorithm 2 gives the timing of the various actions for the
simulated version of the model. A particular iteration starts with each firm l posting
J vacancies. Workers apply to firms with a positive number of vacancies, with each
worker sending out m applications. Firms evaluate how high their wage offer should
be to optimize on the trade-off of actually attracting workers and not letting the wage
bill increase by too much. Firms make non-binding job offers obeying the non-tradable
employment quota including the wage they are willing to pay to the most profitable
applicants. Workers choose the job with the best wage offer conditional on it being
above their individual reservation wage. Firms that were not able to hire enough women
to fulfill the quota withdraw their offers to male workers.
For the case where we are looking into an economy with a tradable employment quota
firms observe how many workers they are able to attract and compare their stock of
permits with the number of male workers willing to work for them. Each firm draws its
individual supply and demand schedule for the permits. The market maker aggregates
these up and determines the market clearing price at which the permits are reallocated
between firms. Firms not able to purchase the required number of permits for all the
men who wanted to work for them withdraw their offers to the least profitable men.
Finally, the firms produce and observe their payoffs. At the end of each iteration all
workers are dismissed and the cycle restarts.
4.4.2 Parametrization
We simulate a labor market with six sectors (S = 6) each hosting N = 20 firms. Each
firm has J = 10 positions to fill. Total supply of workers is I = 1, 200 and reservation
wages are equally distributed on [0, A]. There is an equal number of male and female
workers. When applying for jobs workers send m = 5 applications. A firm that fills
a vacancy with a worker that has sector specific skills produces A = 2. The wage
adjustment parameter τ = 10 implies that firms learn over the past 10 iterations. They
adjust wages from one iteration to the other with  = 0.05 which equals 2.5% of a
worker’s maximum productivity.
In one version of the simulation model firms do not discriminate (µ = 0) and women
are equally distributed across sectors (σ = 0.5 = σk). In the other version firms taste
discriminate (µ = 0.5 and dF = 0.5). In the latter case, sectors are split into two types.
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create sectors;
create workers;
create firms;
if tradable quota then distribute permits;
for t = 0 to T do
for all firms l = 1 to L do
post vacancies
end
for all workers i = 1 to I do
send m applications
end
for all firms l = 1 to L do
adjust wage offer given past experience
send non-binding job offers
end
for all workers i = 1 to I do
if wage offer above reservation wage then
accept best wage offer
else
decline
end
end
if tradable quota then for all firms l = 1 to L do
draft supply and demand schedules for permits
end
central market makers aggregates supply and demand schedules central market
makers determines clearing price central market makers reallocates permits ;
for all firms l = 1 to L do
if affirmative action policy is not fulfilled then firm withdraws offers to excess
workers;
produce
dismiss workers
end
for all workers i = 1 to I do
if wage offer above reservation wage then
accept best wage offer
else
decline
end
end
end
Algorithm 1: Pseudocode of model implementation
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There is one half of evenly numbered sectors where the share of taste discriminating
firms is µs = 0.1 and the share of female labor supply σk = 0.7. In the oddly numbered
sectors the share of discriminating firms is µs = 0.9 and the share of female labor supply
σk = 0.3.
The parametrization for the policies is as follows. First we look into an affirmative
action policy which prescribes every single firm to employ at least 50% women. Then,
we introduce a tradable employment quota. 180 permits are equally distributed among
the firms at the beginning of a run. Table 4.3 summarizes all these parameters.
Justifying the choice of parameters is inherently difficult as some of these parameters
are hardly observable and empirical estimates are lacking. A firm’s taste for men is
hardly measurable so that one has to recur to its consequences arising in terms of the
wage differentials we observe between men and women. But even those raw differentials
which often amount to about 25% lower wages for women (see, e.g., Altonji and Blank,
1999b) have to be corrected for various other characteristics of the firms and workers.
That skills and industry are among those control variables in empirical studies of wage
differentials may be seen as justifying our assumption on the declining productivity of
workers coming from adjacent sectors. The choice of parameters on workers’ application
behavior was based on the notion of a labor market with frictions and adjusted such
that workers apply mostly in their skill-specific sector but also consider adjacent sectors.
The larger share of non-discriminatory firms coming with higher shares of female labor
supply shall reflect the occupational crowding of women in sectors where they expect
not to be discriminated. The quota policy parameter is in the range of the policies we
actually observe or have been proposed in the ongoing policy debates (see our discussion
in the introduction). Given the limited evidence and the stylized nature of the simulation
model, it becomes most important to evaluate the findings against parameter changes
which we do in a section on robustness (see 4.5.3) once the main results have been
presented and discussed.
Each iteration t as described in the Pseudocode is replicated for T = 1, 010 times.
This we call a single run. Every treatment consists of 100 runs. For our analysis of
the simulation outcome we record the average of the last 10 observations of every run.
Thus, we have 100 observations for every treatment.
4.4.3 Difference-in-Difference Approach
A simple comparison of a tradable with a non-tradable quota would yield flawed results
with respect to their labor market effects. Only if it was possible to issue the number
of permits which exactly matches the restrictions that firms are facing from a uniformly
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Table 4.3: Parameter choices
Parameters
Number of sectors S = 6
Number of firms per sector N = 20
Vacancies per firm J = 10
Full productivity A = 2
Sectoral productivity decline a = 0.5
Learning period τ = 10
Wage adjustment  = 0.05
Number of workers I = 1, 200
Overall share of female workers σ = 0.5
Number of applications per worker m = 5
Intensity of choice λ = 1
Share of discriminating firms µ = {0; 0.5}
Discrimination coefficient dM = 0, dF = 0.5
Quota σ¯ = 0.5
Number of permits C = 180
applied quota the two policies would be comparable. However, as overall employment
and the structure of employment by gender are endogenous this particular number of
permits which makes the policies comparable cannot be determined in advance.
As a solution we apply a difference-in-difference approach to analyze the policy effects in
comparison. Later on, in the robustness section we implement an alternative approach.
For now, the procedure will be to compare the difference of the variables of interest
arising from a non-tradable employment quota comparing a labor market with an equal
distribution of women and firms without discrimination to a labor market with an un-
equal distribution of women and of discriminating firms, with the difference between the
same variables under a tradable employment quota. Denote with v the labor market
variable of interest, with ntq the policy of a non-tradable employment quota, with tq the
tradable employment quota, and with eq equally distributed female workers and firms
and with uneqDis unequally distributed female workers and discriminating firms across
sectors. Then, the policy effect T writes
T = (v(ntq,eq) − v(ntq,uneqDis))− (v(tq,eq) − v(tq,uneqDis)). (4.14)
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4.5 Simulation Results
4.5.1 Baseline Scenarios Without Policy
We start off with the version of our simulation model to which no policies, neither the
tradable nor the non-tradable quota are applied and compare two cases. In one case,
female workers and firms are equally distributed across all sectors, and there is no taste
discrimination. In the other case, taste discriminating firms and workers are unequally
distributed across sectors as explained in Section 4.4.2. The simulation results are shown
using box plots drawing on the 100 observations for each treatment.
Figure 4.1 (a) shows the employment rates for both versions of the model. As expected
male and female employment match on the left hand side as there are no discriminating
firms and allocation of female workers and firms is homogeneous across sectors. Turn-
ing to the discriminatory version of the simulation model (uneqDis) reveals that male
employment increases while female employment decreases. The employment pattern of
the discriminatory version of the model is reflected in the wages by gender. Panel (b)
shows that female wages fall short of the male wages. Note, that within this baseline
scenario a quota could be a way to improve on the labor market prospects of women in
the unequal case. However, we will argue that tradable permits will reach the same goal
with lower distortions of welfare.
The employment and the wage effects are triggered by the introduction of discriminatory
firms. First, due to their taste discriminating behavior those firms offer lower wages to
women. Women who were willing to work at going labor market conditions withdraw
from the labor market as wage offers decrease. Consequently female employment de-
clines. Discriminatory firms looking for male workers to fill their vacancies will have to
increase their wage offers to draw on an additional male labor supply. Male workers
who did not choose to work formerly accept job offers now and, thus, male employment
increases. Secondly, however, choices of the discriminatory firms have spill over effects
on the behavior of the non-discriminating firms in the same and adjacent sectors. As
can be seen in Figure 4.1 (c) the non-discriminating firms have a larger share of their
vacancies filled than the discriminating firms. The difference in overall employment by
the two types of firms arises as the discriminating firms have a substantially lower body
of female workers. To the contrary, the non-discriminating firms employ significantly
more female workers and less male workers. The non-discriminatory firms adjust their
gender specific employment pattern as a response to the discriminatory behavior of their
competitors. The gender wage gap (panel d) at discriminating firms reflects the dis-taste
of those firms against women and manifests itself in the employment pattern due to the
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Figure 4.1: Employment and wage effects; (a) total employment rates by distribution
of female workers and firms, (b) average wages by distribution of female workers and
firms, (c) employment rates at disc. vs. non-disc. firms by gender, (d) average wages
at disc. vs. non-disc. firms by gender.
distribution of the reservation wages of workers. A further consequence of the taste dis-
criminating firms with respect to the wage pattern is that the non-discriminating firms
pay lower male wages than the discriminatory firms because for them a female worker
is a perfect substitute for a male worker.
Overall these simulations are in line with the findings of the existing literature on taste
discrimination in search models of the labor market. As in Kaas (2009) and Kaas and Lu
(2010) our simulation model generates employment segregation. The non-discriminating
firms employ more women than men and the discriminating firms employ substantially
more men. Comparable to Bowlus and Eckstein (2002) wages for women are lower
than those for men. Moreover, we can relate to the search and matching model with
heterogeneous reservation wages by Burdett and Mortensen (1998) who argue for the
emergence of a wage dispersion in such frameworks. As we re-run our simulation model
we do not get a single market wage, neither by gender nor by the type of firm for the
100 repetitions.
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Figure 4.2: Bid-ask-diagram for permit trading market with an unequal female labor
supply and discriminating firms across sectors at iteration 1,005.
4.5.2 Policy evaluation
4.5.2.1 Trading of Permits
Let us first look into the functioning of the permit market. Figure 4.2 shows a snapshot of
the supply and demand schedules that the market maker is facing for a discriminatory
labor market at a particular iteration. The downward sloping market demand stems
from aggregating up the individual firms’ demands for permits given prices. Similarly
the upward sloping supply is the sum of permits that firms are willing to sell at given
prices. As explained earlier, the market maker chooses the price where supply and
demand schedules cross and reallocates the permits from those willing to sell at the
market clearing price to those firms willing to buy.
The price for the permits and the traded volume as shown in Figure 4.2 refer to one
iteration whereas the observations entering the box plots in Figures 4.3 (a) and (b) are
the averages over ten iterations for the 100 runs. At the median about 64 permits are
traded between firms. Prices are in the order of 0.44 which is slightly more than one
fifth of the maximum productivity of a worker.
4.5.2.2 Welfare Effects
We define welfare as the sum of all wages paid in the economy and all payoffs accruing to
firms. The welfare effects of the two policies using the difference-in-difference approach
from equation (4.14) can be seen in Table 4.4. The first row shows a decline in welfare
of 155 units as we move from a non-discriminatory labor market to a discriminatory
labor market applying a non-tradable employment quota. Welfare also decreases for a
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Figure 4.3: (a) Permit trading, and (b) permit prices
tradable employment quota as we make the labor market discriminatory by 75 units.
However, the decline is smaller so that the comparison of the welfare losses between
the two policies (80) speaks for a tradable employment quota as the superior policy
instrument.
These units may be interpreted in relation to total possible output. With 1,200 workers
and a maximum per worker productivity of 2, the maximum of total units possible to
produce in this economy is 2,400. Measured welfare falls short of the output potential
due to the wage offers of profit maximizing firms below reservation wages which drives
workers out of the market, and the allocation of workers to sectors where their pro-
ductivity does not fully unfold. In Table 4.4 the output loss due to skill mismatch is
calculated as the difference between actual output and the output that could have been
achieved if all workers were employed in their own sector unfolding full productivity.
Overall the output loss due to skill mismatch is lower under the tradable quota. This
is because firms can adjust to their labor market situation by engaging on the permit
market, while under a non-tradable quota firms will try to fulfill the quota even if this
means they have to hire somebody from a different sector. However, as we move from an
equal to an unequal distribution of firms and workers over sectors the reduction in output
loss due to skill mismatch is larger for the non-tradable quota. This is due to the fact
that discriminatory firms are not able to hire women from other sectors as their distaste
for women and the sectoral productivity decline induces them to offer too low wages
to women from other sectors. Given the limited labor supply of women in their own
sector, hiring women from neighboring sectors would be an option in order to fulfill the
quota. However, the wages that these firms are able to offer are not attractive enough.
Under a tradable quota such problems do not occur, as discriminatory firms in sectors
with a smaller female labor supply will simply engage on the permit market. The payoff
loss due to the distaste for women of discriminating firms is the wage equivalent of the
Chapter 4. Tradable Employment Quota 63
T
a
b
l
e
4
.4
:
W
el
fa
re
a
n
a
ly
si
s
eq
u
n
eq
D
is
d
iff
n
on
-t
ra
d
ab
le
q
u
ot
a
w
el
fa
re
7
1
1
.0
3
8
5
5
5
.9
5
2
-1
5
5
.0
8
6
ou
tp
u
t
lo
ss
d
u
e
to
sk
il
l
m
is
m
at
ch
4
6
.9
6
0
3
3
.2
9
4
-1
3
.6
6
7
co
st
of
d
is
ta
st
e
fo
r
w
om
en
0
2
3
.4
2
5
2
3
.4
2
5
ou
tp
u
t
lo
ss
d
u
e
to
u
n
fi
ll
ed
va
ca
n
ci
es
1
,6
4
1
.9
8
4
1
,7
8
7
.3
2
6
1
4
5
.3
4
2
ou
tp
u
t
p
ot
en
ti
al
2
,4
0
0
2
,4
0
0
tr
ad
ab
le
q
u
ot
a
w
el
fa
re
7
7
2
.7
9
8
6
9
7
.7
7
9
-7
5
.0
1
9
ou
tp
u
t
lo
ss
d
u
e
to
sk
il
l
m
is
m
at
ch
4
0
.4
7
9
3
1
.8
0
3
-8
.6
7
6
co
st
of
d
is
ta
st
e
fo
r
w
om
en
0
1
0
.3
6
6
1
0
.3
6
6
ou
tp
u
t
lo
ss
d
u
e
to
u
n
fi
ll
ed
va
ca
n
ci
es
1
,5
8
6
.6
8
6
1
,6
6
0
.0
3
8
7
3
.3
5
3
ou
tp
u
t
p
ot
en
ti
al
2
,4
0
0
2
,4
0
0
T
(d
iff
-i
n
-d
iff
)
S
td
.
e
rr
w
el
fa
re
8
0
.0
6
7
*
*
*
4
.9
6
9
ou
tp
u
t
lo
ss
d
u
e
to
sk
il
l
m
is
m
at
ch
4
.9
9
0
*
*
*
0
.7
5
2
co
st
of
d
is
ta
st
e
fo
r
w
om
en
-1
3
.0
6
0
*
*
*
0
.3
1
4
ou
tp
u
t
lo
ss
d
u
e
to
u
n
fi
ll
ed
va
ca
n
ci
es
-7
1
.9
8
9
*
*
*
5
.1
1
6
N
o
te
:
*
*
*
d
en
o
te
si
g
n
ifi
ca
n
ce
a
t
th
e
1
%
le
ve
l.
Chapter 4. Tradable Employment Quota 64
distaste (dF ) multiplied with the female employment at discriminating firms. As there
is less female employment at discriminating firms those costs decrease with a tradable
employment quota. The largest effect on welfare of a tradable employment quota comes
from a reduction of unfilled vacancies as the permits give firms a higher flexibility in
terms of the gender composition of their workforce. The sum of these differentiated
effects gives the welfare effect of the two policies in comparison.
4.5.2.3 Effect on Employment, Wages, and Payoffs to Firms
An alternative way of looking at these welfare measures is to split welfare in firm payoffs
and the wage sum (see Table 4.5). Here we find that the wage sum is approximately
twice as large as the payoffs to firms. When looking at the differences-in-differences
result in the lowest third of the table we find that more than 70% of the effect of a
tradable employment quota on welfare accrue to changes in the wage sum. This effect
we can disentangle into an employment and a wage effect. The remaining effect on
welfare is due to changes in the payoffs to the firms .
The drop in employment is less pronounced for the tradable quota as one moves from
a non-discriminatory labor market to a discriminatory labor market if compared to the
non-tradable quota. Why is that? Essentially, it is driven by the economic mechanisms
that was already detected in the simplified version solved analytically. Without permits
a firm wanting to produce may be constrained by the employment quota. There is a
vacancy to be filled, and while there is no female applicant to fill the vacancy, a male
worker would be willing to accept the job offer. However, the firm cannot employ him
because the employment quota has to be obeyed. A tradable employment quota gives
firms facing such a situation more flexibility. They may purchase a permit allowing
them to employ an additional man, and they will do so as long as the additional male
worker’s profitability covers the price of the permit. Thus, more vacancies can actually
become productive with a tradable employment quota in a discriminatory labor market
as reflected in the non-decline of the male employment rate for the tradable quota.
Moreover, for the tradable employment quota there is only a small wage effect while
wages decrease for the non-tradable quota. Looking into the gender composition of the
wage effect reveals that this occurs mainly because female wages decrease more for the
non-tradable quota. As discriminating firms are facing a fixed quota they are required
to hire women in order to balance their workforce. However, due to their distaste for
women they are only willing to do this at a lower wage. This effect is non-existent for
the more flexible tradable quota because discriminating firms can avoid to hire women
by purchasing permits.
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Table 4.5: Effect on employment, wages, and payoffs to firm
eq uneqDis diff
non-tradable quota
payoffs 228.937 183.868 -45.069
wage sum 482.101 372.084 -110.017
empl. 0.316 0.255 -0.061
empl. female 0.452 0.388 -0.064
empl. male 0.180 0.123 -0.057
ave. wage 1.272 1.215 -0.057
ave. wage female 1.287 1.214 -0.073
ave. wage male 1.233 1.215 -0.018
tradable quota
payoffs 266.377 242.537 -23.840
wage sum 506.421 455.242 -51.179
empl. 0.339 0.308 -0.031
empl. female 0.378 0.317 -0.061
empl. male 0.300 0.300 0.000
ave. wage 1.245 1.230 -0.015
ave. wage female 1.269 1.229 -0.039
ave. wage male 1.215 1.231 0.016
T(diff-in-diff) Std. err
payoffs 21.228 *** 1.959
wage sum 58.838 *** 4.070
empl. 0.030 *** 0.002
empl. female 0.003 0.004
empl. male 0.057 *** 0.001
ave. wage 0.042 *** 0.005
ave. wage female 0.034 *** 0.006
ave. wage male 0.034 *** 0.007
Note: *** denote significance at the 1% level.
Finally, the increase in the employment rate also explains the effect of a tradable em-
ployment quota on payoffs as an otherwise unproductive vacancy is filled now.
One may even go further and analyze the distributional consequences of the two policies
in comparison. How are the policies affecting wages paid at discriminating and non-
discriminating firms, and do we observe effects on wages paid to workers employed in
their own sector or in a sector which does not fully match their skills? Furthermore,
how do the firms payoffs adjust with respect to the two policies in comparison. This is
analyzed in Table 4.6.
Wages paid to workers who found jobs in the sector for which their skills match best
decrease less if we move to an unequal distribution of firms and workers for the tradable
quota if compared to the non-tradable quota. The same but larger effect can be observed
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Table 4.6: Distributional effects
eq uneqDis diff
non-tradable quota
ave. wage own sector 1.371 1.312 -0.059
ave. wage other sector 0.937 0.828 -0.109
ave. wage non-disc. 1.272 1.282 0.010
ave. wage non-disc. female 1.287 1.301 0.014
ave. wage non-disc. male 1.233 1.202 -0.031
ave. wage disc. 1.272 1.004 -0.268
ave wage disc. female 1.287 0.868 -0.420
ave. wage disc. male 1.233 1.232 -0.001
payoff disc. 1.908 0.680 -1.228
payoff non-disc. 1.908 2.384 0.476
tradable quota
ave. wage own sector 1.331 1.308 -0.024
ave. wage other sector 0.861 0.818 -0.043
ave wage non-disc. 1.245 1.249 0.004
ave. wage non-disc. female 1.269 1.274 0.005
ave. wage non-disc. male 1.215 1.166 -0.049
ave. wage disc. 1.245 1.202 -0.043
ave. wage disc. female 1.269 0.862 -0.407
ave. wage disc. male 1.215 1.256 0.040
payoff disc. 2.220 1.646 -0.574
payoff non-disc. 2.220 2.396 0.176
T(diff-in-diff) Std. err
ave. wage own sector 0.035 *** 0.000
ave. wage other sector 0.066 *** 0.000
ave. wage non-disc. -0.006 0.005
ave. wage non-disc. female -0.008 0.006
ave. wage non-disc. male -0.018 ** 0.008
ave. wage disc. 0.224 *** 0.005
ave. wage disc. female 0.013 * 0.007
ave. wage disc. male 0.041 *** 0.007
payoff disc. 0.654 *** 0.016
payoff non-disc. -0.300 *** 0.020
Note: ***, **, * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, 10% levels, respectively. Entries in
italics are approximated values for the firms which are currently non-discriminating but
become discriminating firms for an unequal distribution of firms and workers.
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for average wages of workers not employed in their own sector. Thus, there is some
heterogeneity in the overall wage effect already detected in Table 4.4. Disentangling
the overall wage effect along discriminating and non-discriminating firms reveals the
following picture: the average wage of discriminating firms falls quite dramatically when
moving from an equal to an unequal distribution with a non-tradable quota. This is
because discriminating firms are forced to hire females, but pay much lower wages. For
the tradable quota the share of females hired by discriminatory firms is quite low and
thus the lower wages for females have a lower weight when calculating average wages.
Actually, decomposing those wages by gender reveals that it is the wages paid to male
workers by the discriminating firms driving this effect. Those firms are not constrained
by a fixed quota anymore. Rather they are allowed to hire more men if they own the
corresponding number of permits. But hiring those additional men requires to offer
higher wages.
On average the discriminating firms have lower payoffs than the non-discriminating firms
in both policy scenarios. This is due to their distaste for women and the lower wages
they pay. As a consequence they draw on a smaller female labor supply which allows
them to only fill fewer vacancies. The wedge between the payoffs of the discriminating
and non-discriminating firms decreases with a tradable quota as the discriminating firms
may purchase permits and thereby avoid idle vacancies due to their distaste for women.
Relatively speaking, the discriminating firms profit from a tradable employment quota.
It may be noteworthy at this point that looking into the distribution of payoffs to firms
over time reveals that even the least profitable firms have non-negative payoffs (and will
stay in the market.)
Comparing the results from the simulation model with what we derived earlier on within
our analytical framework shows that similar economic mechanisms are driving the main
outcomes. This is so although the simulation model rests on adaptively behaving firms
and analytical results were derived under the usual assumption of rationally behaving
firms. Rationality does not seem to be the crucial assumption being responsible for the
effects of the two policies in comparison. Rather it occurs that adaptively behaving
firms trying to find a wage offer which maximizes their profits is a somehow equivalent
assumption to rationality in this context. One may even claim that it is also more
appropriate as in a new policy environment firms will also have to find out for themselves
how to behave best.
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4.5.3 Robustness
We ran a series of robustness tests involving (a) the change of particular modeling
assumptions, (b) changes of key parameters of our model, (c) a different initial allocation
of permits to firms, and (d) an alternative evaluation of the effects of a tradable permit
system when compared to a fixed quota. In all four instances we were interested in
whether our main result of the positive welfare effect of a tradable employment quota
prevails.
In our baseline model we let firms post wage offers to prospective workers without taking
into account the upcoming costs that may arise with the need to purchase permits to
employ men. Alternatively, one may imagine that firms make wage offers already taking
into account that they may have to go to the permit market. To this end we ran a series
of robustness tests where firms anticipate that they will have to hold permits in order
to employ men and thus adjust the wage taking into consideration an estimate of the
permit price. In particular, this estimated permit price pet in period t was calculated as
the average price over the last ten periods: pet =
(∑t−1
τ=t−10 pτ
)
/10. It turned out that
this led to lower wages and lower employment for men, while employment of women
increased even further. Our main result, however, that a permit system is superior to a
fixed quota was not affected.
In order to analyze whether our results are sensitive to changes in the parametrization
of the model we combined the two key policy parameters, i.e. the number of permits
issued and the quota with all of the remaining parameters, one-by-one, and re-ran the
simulations. The results of this exercise are summarized in Figures 4.4, 4.5, and 4.6. In
all left columns of those figures we combine changes in the number of permits with one of
the remaining parameters. In the right columns we combine changes in the quota with
one of the remaining parameters. The grids are over three values of each parameter. The
welfare effects of those nine parameter constellations are combined to a plane. The dark
blue planes show the mean effect on the diff-in-diff welfare measure of 100 repetitions.
Upper and lower planes in gray constitute the confidence intervals. The black dots refer
to the diff-in-diff value for the welfare effect at the standard parameter constellation
chosen in Table 4.5.
Figure 4.4 collects all parameters related to the adjustment behavior of agents and the
number of iterations of each run. In order to exemplify how to read those graphs let us
turn to Figure 4.4 (a). As we increase the number of iterations there is no change in
the welfare measure which suggests that we have chosen an appropriate length for our
simulation runs, i.e. one where the adjustment processes have worked themselves out.
The flat plane furthermore indicates that this observation holds for the higher and also
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the lower value of permits. Turning to Figure 4.4 (b) replicates the analysis for a fixed
quota showing that also in this case increasing the number of iterations does not alter
the results. Changing the wage adjustment parameter or the learning period of the firms
does not affect our main finding, either.
Figure 4.5 brings together parameters related to frictions in the labor market. Here, we
were mainly interested in whether the number of applications sent out by the workers,
their attachment to the skill-specific sector, and the closeness of sectors in terms of
how suitable workers are for firms that come from adjacent sectors affect our simulation
outcomes. Again, the results confirm our main findings.
Finally, Figure 4.6 assembles all robustness analyses related to parameters describing
the discriminatory behavior of firms. This set of analyses may also be interpreted as a
test on the robustness of the results given that firms’ behavior may change over time.
One could imagine that firms confronted with affirmative action policies or an evolving
market reconsider their behavior and become non-discriminatory. Although we opted for
a modeling of discriminatory behavior in the sense of taste discrimination, such behavior
may, in particular, arise if one thinks of statistical discrimination as an alternative
explanation of discriminatory behavior where firms may update their beliefs over time.
Then the question arises whether a tradable quota system is still working. To this end,
we alter the firms’ costs of discrimination, the distribution of discriminatory firms over
sectors, and the distribution of women over sectors. Once more, the permit system yields
welfare gains.
Another look at the right columns of all three Figures 4.4, 4.5, and 4.6 reveals that
the welfare effects of a tradable quota relative to a non-tradable quota measured along
the diff-in-diff methodology increases as the non-tradable quota becomes smaller. This
result is driven by a lower difference in welfare for a fixed quota comparing an equal
with an unequal distribution of firms at decreasing quotas (as the number of permits is
unaffected by this change). A lower non-tradable quota increases welfare for an equal
distribution of firms and women across sectors as it is easier for firms to meet this
requirement. However, the increase becomes smaller as the quota is less binding (the
slope when moving from a 60% quota to a 50% quota is steeper as compared to moving
from a 50% quota to a 40% quota). For an unequal distribution of discriminating firms
and women across sectors a less binding quota does not have the same effect on additional
production. This is due to the discriminating firms offering lower wages because of their
distaste for women, thus depressing female labor supply so that those firms will not be
able to hire women which would allow them to fill vacancies with additional men even
under a relaxed quota.
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In our baseline simulation we allocated permits on a per-capita basis to the firms ini-
tially. One may wonder how alternative allocations of permits affect the results. We
experimented with various other rules including a random and a highly skewed distri-
bution of permits. As time evolves we get similar results in terms of welfare differences
between the two policy instruments when compared to the per-capita rule.
Finally, we opted for an alternative evaluation of the policy effects. Rather than em-
ploying a diff-in-diff approach we modeled a government that endogenously adjusts the
number of permits issued in every period so that policies become comparable. More
specifically, for this robustness test permits are valid for only one period and the gov-
ernment every period issues a number of permits that would achieve a ratio of male to
female employment compliant with a quota. What we expected from such an exercise is
that on average welfare is higher for the policy simulations with tradable permits than
with a fixed quota. And indeed, that is what the simulations showed which makes us
more confident that the results are not driven by our methodology chosen to evaluate
the policy effects.
4.6 Discussion
Discrimination of women (as well as other labor market groups) calls for affirmative
action policies. In an economy where women’s labor supply is heterogeneous across
sectors or regions, an employment quota applied uniformly to firms may cause avoidable
costs to society. Firms located in sectors where the supply of female labor is relatively
scarce may find it inherently difficult to comply with an employment quota whereas
firms in other sectors where female labor supply is relatively strong will do better in
terms of filling vacancies with female workers. Output losses may occur in sectors with
relatively weak female labor supply as firms subject to the employment quota cannot
fill up vacancies with men even if a woman cannot be found.
We propose and analyze a flexible quota solution. As we argue, a tradable employment
quota gives firms additional flexibility to hire men if female labor supply is insufficient.
By issuing permits to firms allowing them to hire men and making these permits tradable
across firms, firms in shortage of women will not be forced to abandon output. Rather
they will try to purchase a permit that allows them to hire a man up to the point where
this additional man’s profitability covers the costs of the permit. Equally, we will have
firms in this market that will find it profitable to sell permits as they can easily fill their
vacancies with women. An advantage of a tradable permit system is that it allows for a
flexible adjustment at the firm level without having to compromise on the overall policy
goal to achieve a certain share of female employment in the labor market. The scope
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of female employment in the economy can be managed at the aggregate level by issuing
or withdrawing permits. Our results suggest that a market for a tradable employment
quota may emerge, and that a more flexible policy solution is actually improving welfare.
Those results have to be interpreted as arising from a comparison between two different
policy measures trying to achieve higher female employment shares. Running our model
without any restrictions on employer behavior yields higher welfare levels than what
one gets in the policy experiments. From our point of view, however, a meaningful
discussion of affirmative action policies starts from policy goal that female employment
should improve, and then tries to answer the question which policy measures are most
suitable to achieve this goal. Our exercise should be seen as a contribution in this spirit.
Although we did make an effort to implement features of the labor and permit market
in considerable detail, we have been silent about the occupational or regional scope
of a permit system. Given our discussion in the introduction on the recent moves to
make shares of female workers legally binding for boards of firms, one may at first think
of a permit market for that segment. In principle, however, we believe that a tradable
employment quota would also work for other groups of occupations, may it be introduced
nationally or for a set of countries (as it may work for other under-represented groups
in the labor market).
An outcome of our analysis is that a tradable employment quota achieves an overall
female employment rate at lower costs for society but results in an unequal distribution
of women across firms. One may question such an outcome on the backdrop of a more
normative assessment which posts that women should be equally represented also on a
firm basis. In this case, evaluation of policies would certainly be tilted towards a non-
tradable quota. Moreover, in a comparison of the two policies one might be inclined to
favor a fixed quota if one believes that forcing firms to employ women may help to reduce
prejudices against women as a possible cause of discriminatory behavior. We abstained
from modeling such a feedback process as there seems to be no strong evidence currently
available that points towards such a channel (see, e.g., Bertrand et al., 2010). Moreover,
it is not clear to us if a fixed employment quota would only help changing preferences
of “male” firms towards becoming more “neutral”. Actually, there is evidence reporting
that women being protected by fixed employment quotas are stigmatized (Heilman et al.,
1992, 1997). Thus, a fixed quota might actually lead to additional discrimination as
women are disrespected by “ordinary” employees.
If Norwegian firms did not comply with the employment quota by January 2008 they were
planned to be dissolved (Nygaard, 2011, p.23). Rather than forcing firms to go out of
business, one may also think of an implementation where non-complying firms are fined.
Whether such a fining system is functionally equivalent to a cap-and-trade system that
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we propose can be discussed very much along the well known lines of practical problems
arising with the implementation of a Pigouvian tax.10 Very likely the marginal costs for
employing women differ for firms which would require to install tailored penalties (or
taxes). Collecting the necessary information and administrating such a system may be
prohibitively difficult, and a permit trading system a viable alternative.
We also did not compare the two policies with respect to their medium or longer run
consequences. Our focus was rather on how costs for firms that become subject to a
uniform quota and have to change the gender composition of their workforce can be
mitigated right after an affirmative action policy is introduced. While we have shown
that within the short time horizon a tradable quota fares better it is also conceivable
that a tradable quota is the better policy choice in the medium and longer run. It gives
governments a flexible tool that allows them to react to changes in firms’ and workers’
behavior as time evolves by adjusting the supply of permits and thereby the restrictions
that firms are facing. Such a policy response could be easier to implement as changes of
the law which seem to be quite often accompanied with intense public debates.
Our analysis and the results we derive rest on various assumptions we had to make.
Although we ran robustness checks changing the parametrization of our model as well as
the model implementation, one may be concerned about the partial nature of the model
which abstracts from various feedback processes. In particular labor demand of firms
is derived from a fixed product demand. Introducing a fixed or a tradable quota may,
however, change the production costs of firms which firms may pass through to product
prices. Thus, with heterogeneous firms relative prices and firms’ market shares may
change as a consequence of the policies. Actually, there is evidence on cost-pass through
but estimated magnitudes to which extent this happens vary widely, see Goldberg and
Hellerstein (2013) and Fabra and Reguant (2014) for two extreme cases. Given this
rather large variety in estimates with a larger share of estimates finding relatively small
effects of cost-pass through, we believe that a partial model should not bias our main
results substantially. But it may be a worthwhile exercise to embed a comparison of
affirmative actions policies in a macroeconomic model of the economy in future work,
even more so as a larger share of firms becomes subject to these policies.
10Arguments for gender-based taxation have already been brought forward by Rosen (1977), Boskin
and Sheshinski (1983), or, more recently, Alesina et al. (2011). There, differentiated taxes may also
boost female employment at lower losses in welfare because labor supply elasticities differ beween men
and women.
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Figure 4.4: Robustness with respect to dynamic behavior of agents
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Figure 4.5: Robustness with respect to labor market frictions and heterogeneity
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Figure 4.6: Robustness with respect to extent of discrimination
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Table 4.7: Women on boards
Country Members of board Board chairs [%] CEOs [%]
Ave. share [%] Min [%] Max [%]
USA (a) 16
Japan 1
EU-27 16 3 2
Finland 29 4 0
Latvia 28 13 3
Sweden 26 0 4
...
Germany 18 0 (b) 44 (b) 3 0
...
Portugal 7 0 0
Hungary 7 0 0
Malta 4 0 5
Norway (c) 39
Data source: European Commission Database on women and men in decision making for 2012 if not
otherwise stated. (a) European Commission: Women on boards - Factsheet 2, Gender equality in
member states; (b) Der Spiegel 48/2013, p.74; (c) Ahern and Dittmar (2012, p.143).
Chapter 5
Key Players in Labor Market
Networks1
5.1 Introduction
The importance of social networks in shaping behavior and economic outcomes is well
documented (for an overview see for instance Durlauf (2004), Ioannides and Loury
(2004), Jackson (2014)). Typical channels through which peers affect the economic
outcomes of individuals are the dissemination of job information and the way in which
education and other human capital decisions are influenced through connections in the
network. We know for instance that a large percentage of jobs are found through per-
sonal networks. Mark Granovetter (Granovetter (1973), Granovetter (1995)) using sur-
vey data finds that over 50 percent of jobs were obtained through social contacts. A
similar study by Rees (1966) finds an estimate of over 60 percent.2 Brock and Durlauf
(2001) show in a theoretical model how individuals’ behavior and decisions are affected
by their desire to conform to the behavior of their peers, which allows to study a wide
array of social phenomena such as entry or withdrawal from the labor force, job search,
participating in criminal activities vs. participation in the above ground economy, stay-
ing in or dropping out of school. There is also a vast and growing empirical literature
that attempts to provide empirical estimates of the Degree to which local interactions
and neighborhood effects influence individual decisions (a comprehensive survey of the
empirical neighborhood literature is given by Ioannides and Topa (2010).
These results have important implications regarding labor market outcomes of individ-
uals who locate in ethnic ”enclaves” within metropolitan areas. Calvo-Armengol and
1This Chapter is based on Akyol (2016b)
2see also Bewley (1999)
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Jackson (2004) for instance show in a theoretical model in which individuals hear about
new jobs through their peers, how the correlation of unemployment between connected
individuals in a network can cause a rise in inequality. Topa (2001) shows using Cen-
sus Tract Data for Chicago how neighborhoods exhibit positive spatial correlations, i.e.
individuals are more likely to be employed if their neighbors are employed. This inter-
dependence between group and individual behavior can precipitate the emergence of so
called low level equilibria or poverty traps, from which individuals cannot escape easily.
At the same time, these social interaction effects also may have important implications
regarding the effectiveness and efficiency of policy interventions (such as educational
training measures), as policies directed at individuals in a network can create ”social
multiplier” effects, i.e policies can have spill-over effects on non-treated individuals who
are connected in the network. The extent to which such repercussion effects are present
is subject to debate.
A number of empirical studies attempt to identify under which conditions such repercus-
sion effects can be utilized for policy measures, e.g. Jackson and Lopez-Pintado (2013)
study these in a general model of diffusion and show how certain behaviors spread within
social networks that exhibit segregation or homophily (the tendency of agents to asso-
ciate with others similar to themselves) and identify conditions under which a behavior
diffuses. Banerjee et al. (2014) also examine in a theoretical analysis, how the central
member of a network who is most apt to diffuse information can be identified. Banerjee
et al. (2013) use detailed demographic and social network data from 43 villages in South
India to estimate the effectiveness of various ”injection points”, i.e. the individuals that
were first informed about the program. These individuals are chosen based on various
degrees of centrality in the network (where centrality is determined based on multiple
measures, e.g. Degree centrality, Eigenvector centrality, etc.).
While there is a vast array of studies that examine to what degree individuals are
affected by the network they are embedded in, the research that looks into implications
or applications of these findings for labor market policies is more scarce. In particular,
it would be of interest how labor market policies could benefit by the knowledge of
certain network structures and possible peer effects. Ballester et al. (2006) examine how
crime rates could be reduced through a policy that consists of targeting the key player,
that is, the player who, once removed, leads to the optimal change in aggregate crime
activity. The approach of this paper looks into a related question of how a labor market
policy such as educational subsidies could increase its effect on a group of individuals
if the network structure is taken into account. To do so, I use a computational labor
market model that allows to evaluate policy measures that are targeted towards central
players. This not only takes network effects into account, but also shows how they can
be utilized by a policy maker to increase the impact of a policy measure. Individuals
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in the model are influenced in their educational decisions by their connections in the
network. The model then simulates the effect certain key player policies such as providing
an educational subsidy to individuals who have a high centrality measure (e.g. Katz-
Bonacich centrality, Eigenvector centrality). The policies can then be evaluated with
regard to their ability to maximize the effect of the policy on the entire network through
diffusion but also regarding the impact on inequality. From a policy maker perspective it
is naturally of special interest to increase these type of peer effects as much as possible
for a given economic policy intervention as they allow for a ’social multiplier’ that
increases the original effect of the policy. Within this context, the goal of this paper
is to investigate these so called spill-over effects on non-treated individuals, specifically
which conditions affect the size of these types of effects. The central questions that
are addressed in the paper are: 1) Which agents in the network should a labor market
policy (e.g. educational measures) be targeted towards in order for the policy to be
most effective? 2) How does such a central player policy affect the inequality within the
group of agents? Does an overall increase of utility also reduce inequality?
Using a computational model extends the literature in a number of ways. It first allows
to introduce large scale networks with various degrees of characteristic network proper-
ties that are observed empirically, such as the degree distributions and the amount of
clustering and thereby gives a better understanding of the diffusion processes that take
place. Meanwhile, the behaviour of the agents can be modelled in various ways and is
not limited by simplifying assumptions in order to ensure tractability. Specifically, once
a formal model of the heterogeneous behavioural dispositions of the agents is given, the
computational approach simulates aggregate outcomes that will result from this individ-
ual behaviour and possible strategic interaction. Furthermore, it features heterogeneous
agents and thereby give deeper insight into inequality within the group of agents.
The results indicate that overall utility can be increased the most by targeting the sub-
sidies towards the most central individuals. Hereby, I find that there is no significant
difference in the type of centrality that was used to find the most central individuals.
This finding is in contrast to the results of previous work that compares centrality mea-
sures (e.g. Ballester et al. (2006) and Banerjee et al. (2013)). This result largely stems
from that fact that unlike small scale networks that are highly highly stylized, on large
scale network the various centrality measures strongly overlap in their choice of central
players and thereby render the differences in overall results insignificant. A second re-
sult is that such a ”targeted” approach comes at the cost of increased inequality. That
is, targeting the individuals who are very central in the network, results in identifying
individuals who are also the most aﬄuent ones in terms of education and income (due to
the correlation in centrality and educational investments). This precipitates a ”Matthew
effect” in the sense that, the individual who are already at an advantage due to their
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position in the network, receive an additional benefit which widens the gap between
them and the agents who are at the periphery of the network.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Chapter 2 introduces the theoretical
model and describes the labor market policies that will be implemented. Chapter 3 then
discusses the computational results of a random transfer policy for the baseline case
with a random graph. The robustness section relaxes the network creating process and
allows for homophily and clustering. Chapter 4 then introduces the targeted approach
and compares the welfare and inequality implications of this policy. Chapter 5 then
concludes.
5.2 Model Specification
5.2.1 Model Specification
Following Ballester et al. (2006) and Benabou (2002) I use a simple network model which
features strategic complementarities in the education level of individuals and includes
inter-temporal educational investment. In particular, the network g consists of a finite
set of agents N=1,..., n. Connections in this graph are represented by an n × n adjacency
matrix G, in which entries gij represent connections between agents i and j, whereas if
gij = 1 agent i is connected to j, and otherwise gij = 0. By convention gii = 0 (zeros on
the diagonal) and gij = gij , i.e. the graph is undirected (links are reciprocal).
5.2.2 Household Characteristics
I consider the educational investment and consumption choices of individual i in the
job market (e.g. investment into a college education). In period 0 agent i chooses
consumption ci0 and c
i
1 to maximize intertemporal utility Ui subject to a lifetime bud-
get constraint that that features an intertemporal investment into education (which
subsequently affects next periods income). These choices then determine the available
education investment into human capital. Any income yt is determined by the amount
of time worked lt and the human capital that is available ht in that period. Income is
then used to finance consumption in the same period, while any income that is not used
for consumption in period t = 0 can then be invested into educational attainment et, i.e.
agents choose in today’s period (t = 0) how much they are willing to forgo in today’s
consumption (c0) in order to invest into their educational attainment which increases
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tomorrow’s income and subsequently tomorrow’s consumption (c1). Investment in edu-
cation is predicated on the assumption of a return in future periods, given by ψ. This
basic model is then extended by introducing a government.
A formal description of the household preferences is given by:
max
cit
U = lnci0 + βlnci1
s.t.
yit = h
i
t ∗ l¯it ∀ t = 0, 1 (5.1)
yˆit = y
i
t − τ it ∀ t = 0, 1 (5.2)
yˆit = c
i
t + e
i
t − αit ∀ t = 0 (5.3)
yˆit = c
i
t ∀ t = 1 (5.4)
hit+1 = h
i
t + e
i
t(1 + ψ) + γ
∑
i∈ν,j 6=i
gije
i
te
j
t ∀ t = 0 (5.5)
where 0 < β < 1 is a discount factor (β = 11+r with r being the discount rate), and
where 0 ≤ γ < 1. For all values of γ 6= 0 we thus have an element of complementarity, in
the sense that agents benefit of the educational attainment of their connections or peers
through getting better job referrals etc. The reasons to assume these type of complemen-
taries abound (see for instance Ballester et al. (2006), Ballester et al. (2010), and Durlauf
(2004)). Complementarity is a fundamental concept of the social interactions literature
and characterizes how an individual i are affected by individuals to which i is connected
(e.g. friends, neighbors, colleagues). The term comprises two channels for such an in-
fluence, namely the attributes of the connected agents and their behaviour, whereas the
former is treated as an exogenous predetermined characteristic while the latter often is
endogenously determined. In the setting of this model, the characteristic item would
be the position of the individual in the network (which is exogenously determined and
does not change throughout the analysis) while the choice between consumption and ed-
ucational investment encompasses the behavioural choice. In the context of this model,
one conceivable reason for such a complementarity could be as follows: the increased
educational investment of the connections of agent i will increase their ability to find a
job and thereby increase the probability for job referrals they can relay back to agent
i.3
3Note that the model abstracts from a possible global substitution effect, i.e. given a limited demand
for workers the increasing education of one individual agent could then also have negative effect on the
job opportunity of all the agents in the model, see for instance Ballester et al. (2010)
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5.2.3 Government Characteristics
The government redistributes income using taxes, τt and transfers, αt. The government
furthermore keeps a balanced budget in every period, i.e. any expenses in form of
subsidies in one period have to be offset by taxes in the very same period (a ”pay-as-
you-go” rule).4 This balanced budget constraint is given by:
∑
i∈ν
τ it =
∑
i∈ν
αit ∀ t = 0, 1 (5.6)
hi0 = h
0
∀i ∈ ν
The effects of this redistribution scheme on overall welfare and inequality will be analyzed
within this class of policies, or its analogue for education finance.
5.2.4 Steady State Analysis
In order to determine the behavior of the agents in the model, the maximization problem
of households is extended in order to include the government budget constraint. Put
differently, households are now taking the balanced budget constraint of the government
into account when solving their maximization problem. The problem of the household
then becomes:
4The robustness section relaxes this assumptions and provides the government with an option to
balance the budget inter temporally
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max
cit
U = lnci0 + βlnci1
s.t.
yit = h
i
t ∗ l¯it ∀ t = 0, 1 (5.7)
yˆit = y
i
t − τ it ∀ t = 0, 1 (5.8)
yˆit = c
i
t + e
i
t − αit ∀ t = 0 (5.9)
yˆit = c
i
t ∀ t = 1 (5.10)
hit+1 = h
i
t + e
i
t(1 + ψ) + γ
∑
i∈ν,j 6=i
gije
i
te
j
t ∀ t = 0 (5.11)∑
i∈ν
τ it =
∑
i∈ν
αit ∀ t = 0, 1 (5.12)
hi0 = h
0
∀i ∈ ν
The first order condition for this maximization problem is then given by:
hi1 = h
i
0(2 + ψ + θ)
β
1 + β
− µj0[1 + ψ + θ]
2 + β
1 + β
+
κ
1 + β
(5.13)
where:
ρj0 = [h
j
0 − τ j0 − cj0 + αj0]
µj0 = [
∑
i∈ν\i
αi0 −
∑
i∈ν\i
τ i0] = τ
i
0 − αi0
θ = γ
∑
i∈ν,j 6=i
gijρ
j
0
κ =
∑
i∈ν
αi1 −
∑
i∈ν\i
τ i1
ζj0 = γ
∑
i∈ν,j 6=i
gij(h
j
0 − cj0)
That is, each individual acts according to this ’best-response’-function in each period
in order to maximize their utility given the exogenous variables and the choices of the
other agents.
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In equation 5.13, if we set taxes equal to zero we obtain:
hi1 = h
i
0(2 + ψ + ζ
j
0)[
β
(1 + β)
]
For this simplified version, hi1 increases for a higher initially given h
i
0, a higher return
on investment, and a higher β. A higher discount factor β implies that the individual is
less impatient and thus willing to shift more income into the next period.
Note that this is a simultaneous move n-player game with payoffs according to the
utility function and strategy spaces R+. Thus, solving the model for n ≥ 2 will require
a computational approach in order to determine possible outcomes. To do so, I use
an agent based model that consists of n-agents which are initialized with with random
values for h1 and previously determined values of the exogenous variables (which will
depend on the type of policy experiment). Afterwards, the agents sequentially begin
to update their value for h1 based on their connections in the network and continue to
do so each round. Put differently, the agents are put in a random order and then the
first agent determines whether the value of h1 is in optimal based on the best response
function and the values for h1 of the connected agents. If this is not the case, the value
is corrected. Then the next agent goes through the same process and updates h1 if
necessary. This process is repeated until no individual changes their value for h1 any
more, i.e. a steady state is achieved in which no agent has an incentive to change their
behaviour unless another agent does so (comparable to a Nash Equilibrium). Below the
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Algorithm 2 conveys the method of implementation:
create agents;
create network;
for t = 0 to T = 50 do
for all agents i = 0 to n do
set h1 according to best response function
end
end
if transfer policy then redistribute according to specific policy;
for t = 0 to T = 50 do
for all agents i = 0 to n do
set h1 according to best response function
end
end
Algorithm 2: Pseudocode of model implementation
Figure 5.1 illustrates how the model converges towards such a steady state for a network
of 10 agents. After a an initial burn in phase in which agents observe the behavior of
their peers and react based on their best-response function. As this process is repeated,
the adjustments become smaller and converge towards zero where all agents reach a
value of h1 at which they do not have an incentive to change their behavior unless other
agents do so. For n = 10 this steady state is typically reached within 10 time steps.
Agent 0 Agent 1 Agent 2 Agent 3 Agent 4
Agent 5 Agent 6 Agent 7 Agent 8 Agent 9
20000
40000
60000
80000
100000
120000
20000
40000
60000
80000
100000
120000
0 10 20 0 10 20 0 10 20 0 10 20 0 10 20
Time
h 1
Figure 5.1: Equilibrium Values of h1
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In order to determine the uniqueness and stability of this steady state I use two ap-
proaches. I initiate each agent with a random value for h1 and ensure that for the same
network, the same equilibrium is reached. Additionally, once the equilibrium is achieved,
I perturb the agents by readjusting their h1 to a random value. The appendix contains
further details on the robustness of the steady state. Once the group of agents arrives
at a steady state, the policy experiments are introduced. The policy experiments set
in motion a similar adjustment process in which the agents sequentially re-adjust their
values for h1. I report the results from the final time step when the steady state is
reached again.
5.3 Experiments and Results
In this section, the computational results are presented. I first explain the basic results
from a simplified model that consists only of 2 agents. This serves the purpose of
describing the underlying model in more detail and also helps to unfold the underlying
mechanisms of the model. When the model is extended to 2 agents agents with unequal
endowments of initial human capital, the severity of inequality can be alleviated very
simply with a transfer from the high endowment agent to the low endowment agent. The
following section then examines the effects of such a transfer policy on overall utility and
inequality as the network agents increases.
5.3.1 Baseline Model
5.3.1.1 Baseline Model with 2 Agents
In order to get an intuition for the basic model, we look into the outcome of a simplified
model consisting of two identical agents with income in period 1 of y0 = $50.000,
5 which
implies human capital h0 = 50, 000. The parameters β and ψ are set to β = 0.99,
ψ = 0.5, and we dispense with the peer effect initially, that is = γ = 0. We then obtain
the values for the endogenous variables in the steady state as summarized in the first
line of Table 5.1.
γ h0 c0 e0 h1 c1 α0 τ0 Mean U Aggr. U
0 50,000 41,876 8,124 62,186 62,186 0 0 21.68 43.36
0.00001 50,000 40,920 9,080 64,445 64,445 0 0 21.69 43.39
Table 5.1: Peer Effects with 2 Agents
5Comparable to the median household income in the US for 2014 $53,657, Source: Federal Reserve
Bank of St Louis
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We can see that the individual consumes $41,876 of her income in the first period
and invests $8,124 into her education. She then obtains total consumption equal to
c0 + c1 =$104, 062. Thus, the investment into education yields a ’return on investment’
for education of $4,062 compared to the counterfactual event in which the individual
would not have invested any of its income in period t = 0 and consumed $50,000 in
both periods (notice that this ’return on investment’ is equal to the value indicated
by ψ = 0.5). The last two columns contain the mean utility and aggregate utility
respectively, and this will be used to compare the overall welfare effects of policies
further below.
Next, we examine the effect of peer effects, i.e. we set γ = 0.00001 in the second line of
table 5.1. Both agents benefit from being connected to each other now, as both benefit
from the others educational investment. This can be explained by the effect of having
γ 6= 0 in Equation 5.11. This complementarity effect causes an additional increase in the
’return on investment’ (in addition to ψ), rendering an increase in e0 more attractive
(and subsequently making up for the foregone consumption today). Consumption in
period t = 0, c0 is reduced to $40,920 (a 2.28% decrease compared to the model without
peer effects) while educational investment, e0 thus increases to $9080 (a 11.77% increase
compared to the model without peer effects). Notice that this causes an increase in
aggregate utility from 43.36 to 43.39. The complementarity effect that is demonstrated
here will be explored further in the following subsections.
5.3.1.2 Inequality
We now examine the effect of inequality by changing the initial endowment of both
agents to h0 = 10, 000 for agent 1 and h0 = 90, 000 for agent 2 (and leaving γ = 0.00001
from here on), which leaves the mean endowment unchanged:
h0 c0 e0 h1 c1 α0 τ0 U Aggr. U
50,000 40,920 9,080 64,445 64,445 0 0 21.69 43.39
10,000 8,071 1,929 13,184 13,184 0 0 18.48 41.34
Table 5.2: Inequality with 2 Agents- Low Endowment Agent
h0 c0 e0 h1 c1 α0 τ0 U Aggr. U
50,000 40,920 9,080 64,445 64,445 0 0 21.69 43.39
90,000 74,994 15,006 112,799 112,799 0 0 22.86 41.34
Table 5.3: Inequality with 2 Agents- High Endowment Agent
We can see that the overall utility decreases from 43.39 to 41.34, which is caused by
the decreasing marginal utility feature of the utility function. The re-distribution of
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initial endowment causes an increase in utility for the high endowment agent which does
not offset the simultaneous decrease in utility for the low endowment agent, i.e. we
have a 5.4% increase in utility for the former and a 14.8% decrease in utility for the
latter (put differently, while the increase and decrease in endowments offset each other
with the total endowment remaining constant, the overall utility decreases). Given this
decrease in overall utility introduced by inequality we next look into a possible remedy
through transfer system, i.e. a tax on the high endowment agent and a subsidy to the
low endowment agent.
5.3.1.3 Subsidies and Taxes
We now examine what happens if we introduce a transfer policy that provides the low
endowment agent with a subsidy α0 = 20, 000 and finances that transfer via taxing the
high endowment agent, i.e. τ0 = 20, 000.
h0 c0 e0 h1 c1 α0 τ0 U Aggr. U
10,000 8,071 1,929 13,184 13,184 0 0 18.48 41.34
10,000 18,279 11,721 91,129 91,129 20,000 0 21.23 42.79
Table 5.4: Subsidides with 2 Agents- Low Endowment Agent
h0 c0 e0 h1 c1 α0 τ0 U Aggr. U
90,000 74,994 15,006 112,799 112,799 0 0 22.86 41.34
90,000 63,141 6,859 36,403 36,403 0 20,000 21.56 42.79
Table 5.5: Subsidides with 2 Agents- High Endowment Agent
When we introduce a subsidy/tax, we observe an increase in aggregate utility, due to
the decreasing marginal utility of the utility functions (the decrease in utility for the
high endowment agents is outweighed by the increase in utility of the low endowment
agents). Thus, the transfer reverses the process from the previous section to a small
degree and alleviates the burden on the low endowment agent. The transfer policy for
a two agent model is comparatively straightforward in the sense that the intricacies
introduced through a network or connections are dispensed with. In the next sections,
these simplifying assumptions will be gradually relaxed to allow for a more complex
network structure and thereby allow for an analysis of peer effects of such a transfer
policy.
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5.3.2 Networks with 10 Agents
We now increase the size of the network to 10 agents (with k = 2 connections for each
agent). In order to demonstrate the functioning of the model, Figure 5.2 depicts a
random network with 10 agents, i.e. each agent randomly selects 2 connections from
array of available connections.
0
1
2
3 4
56
7
8
9
Figure 5.2: Random Network Graph with 10 agents
All of the agents in the network are identical regarding their initial endowment of h0.
The only difference in outcomes for h1 is thus caused by their position in the network
and the resulting measure of centrality. Due to the fact that connections are reciprocal
we observe a strong variation in the actual number of connections agents end up with.
For instance, while agent 7 has indeed a degree of 2, we find agent 4 on the other end
of the degree spectrum with 5 connections. Table 5.6 contains a number of centrality
measures for each agent for the network displayed above. These centrality measures are
defined as follows:
• Degree centrality is defined as the number of connections an agent i has:
Degree(i) =
n∑
j=1
gij
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• Closeness centrality measures the distance between an agent and all other agents
in the network, whereas the distance is defined by the length of the shortest path
between any two agents. Closeness centrality for an agent i then simply is the
reciprocal of the sum of all those distances:
closeness(i) =
1∑n
j=1 dist(i, j)
• Betweenness centrality quantifies the number of times that an agent lies on the
shortest path between two other agents. For agent i (with i 6= j, i 6= k, and j 6= k)
betweenness is then defined as:
betweenness(i) =
∑
i,j,k∈ν
pjk(i)
pjk
where pjk(i) is the number of shortest paths between j and k which go through i
and pjk is the total number of shortest paths between j and k.
• Eigenvector centrality measures the influence of an agent in a network through
measures how well that agent is connected to other well connected agents. For a
given adjacency matrix G, the Eigenvector centrality of an agent i is defined as:
ev(i) =
1
λ
n∑
j=1
gijev(j)
or in Matrix form:
λx = xG
where x is the left-hand Eigenvector of the adjacency Matrix G and λ 6= 0 is the
largest eigenvalue in absolute value of the adjacency matrix G.6
• Bonacich centrality7 is an extension of the Eigenvector centrality that includes an
”attenuation factor” which allows to indicate the type of influence an individual
exerts on others. An individual that is connected to other well connected agents is
very central but not very influential, since those connections are themselves very
well connected. On the other hand an individual that is well connected to other
individuals that are not well connected themselves, is less central than the previous
6By virtue of the Perron-Frobenius theorem, choosing the largest eigenvalue ensures the Eigenvector
solution is both unique and positive for a a given square matrix G that is irreducible and non-negative.
7see Bonacich (1987)
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example, but more influential. This centrality measure can be expressed as:
bonacich(i) =
1
λ
∞∑
k=0
βkGktr
where k is the walk length and Gktr transformed adjacency matrix.
• Intercentrality as proposed by Ballester et al. (2006) extends Bonacich centrality
by measuring each agent i’s centrality and their contribution to every other agents’
Bonacich centrality. It is formally defined as:
intercentrality(i) =
bonacich(i)2
mii(G)
where mii(G) is an element of the matrix M(G) = [I −G]−1.
Depending on the specific position in the network, even agents with the identical Degree,
could still differ with regard to their other centrality measures. For instance, Agents 1
and 6 both have a Degree of 3, however their betweenness centrality is very different
(Agent 1 has a betweenness of 0.05 and Agent 6 has a betweenness of 0.17.
Table 5.6 also displays the endogenous value of h1 for this specific network. A comparison
of the value for h1 reveals that the agent 4 who has the highest value of $76,892 is also
the one with the highest Degree centrality. Figure 5.2 also displays this central role
that agent 4 plays in this network. The fact that a higher Degree causes a higher h1
follows directly from Equation 5.11, where h1 for each agent is a function of the sum
of the respective connections of the agent and their h1. Thus, those agents with more
connections will necessarily end up with a higher value for h1.
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A 0 A 1 A 2 A 3 A 4 A 5 A 6 A 7 A 8 A 9
H 1 71,574 71,553 73,494 70,795 76,892 76,540 71,156 67,999 68,354 73,815
Degree 3.00 3.00 4.00 3.00 5.00 5.00 3.00 2.00 2.00 4.00
Closeness 0.20 0.18 0.21 0.18 0.23 0.21 0.20 0.15 0.16 0.21
Betweenness 0.05 0.05 0.35 0.18 0.37 0.38 0.17 0.03 0.02 0.38
Eigenvector 0.20 0.20 0.19 0.14 0.27 0.26 0.16 0.10 0.12 0.21
Bonacich 0.19 0.19 0.20 0.19 0.23 0.22 0.19 0.17 0.17 0.21
Intercentrality 0.18 0.18 0.20 0.16 0.27 0.26 0.17 0.11 0.12 0.21
Table 5.6: Centralities of a 10 Agent Network
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While the Degree centrality is able to explain the increase in h1 relative to agents with
lower Degrees, it remains incumbent to explain the differences between agents with
similar Degrees. Table 5.6 gives some indication of the high correlation between other
centrality measures and the level of h1.
Figure 5.3: Correlation of centrality Measures with h1
In order to examine this characteristic further, Figure 5.3 plots the correlation between
h1 and the various centrality measures for a larger network consisting of 100 agents.
While the relationship is not perfectly linear a positive trend becomes visible and demon-
strates the role of the other centrality measures in determining the value of h1. Given
that the emergence of the network position of each agent in the model is determined
entirely by a random process in the beginning, we can exclude any influence of h1 on
the network centrality of the agent. We thus know that, not only can the variation in h1
be attributed to a large degree to the position of the individual in the network, but we
can also infer that a high centrality by every measure used here is indicative of a high
value of h1.
These results are indicative of the role of centrality in explaining the activity level of
an individual in the network and are in line with Ballester et al. (2006) and Ballester
et al. (2010) who use a crime network model where each agent’s effort level depends on
the effort level of their contacts in the network. They demonstrate that the effort level
is proportional to the Katz-Bonacich centrality of each agent. Calvo-Armengol et al.
(2009b) studies how centrality in friendship networks affects educational outcomes and
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find a similar mapping between Katz-Bonacich centrality of each agent and the effort
levels in education. Using the unique dataset of friendship networks from the National
Longitudinal Survey of Adolescent Health (Add Health) they find that after controlling
for observable individual characteristics and unobservable network specific factors, the
individual’s position in a network (as measured by her Katz-Bonacich centrality) is a
key determinant of her level of activity. Each of these approaches purports to estimate
the ability to predict the activity level of individual based on their centrality in their
network.
We now return to the previous case of two separate groups of agents, i.e. the group of
agents is now divided into two groups of agents of equal size (nA = nB = 5) with agents
within each group being identical except for their position in the network. The human
capital distribution from before remains, i.e. we have:
• hA0 = 10, 000
• hB0 = 90, 000
Apart from the initial endowment the agents across groups are identical and their equi-
librium values of endogenous variables are entirely determined by their position in the
network. The networks are created entirely randomly as before, i.e. each agent chooses
k connections out of the nine possible agents to connect with (connections are undi-
rected).8 Again, some agents then end up with more connections than k, as they are
chosen randomly by more agents to connect with. Figure 5.11 illustrates a representative
network consisting of these two groups.
Given the random nature of network creation there is a large number of possible network
realizations for a size of 10.9 Given that the individual outcomes of h1 will entirely
depend on this network structure there a great variety of possible aggregates of h1. In
order to evaluate policies, I thus compare average outcomes for 100 networks for each
setting.
The policy from the previous section is now slightly adjusted in the sense that the sub-
sidy is provided to one agent from the low endowment group and then equally paid for
via taxing the high endowment agents by an equal share. This ”shock” or ”treatment”
is then propagated through the network as agents who are connected to this particu-
lar agent have to re-adjust their initial educational investments. The recipient of the
subsidy is chosen randomly initially. Later on, in order to determine the importance of
8In the robustness section alternative ways of creating the network such as homophily and clustering
are discussed
9for a network size of n = 10, there could be 2(n(n−1)/2) = 245 possible networks.
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Figure 5.4: Random Network Graph with 50 Agents of Each Type
various centrality measures when choosing an initial ’key player’, I compare the resulting
aggregate utility levels and inequality before and after the introduction of the policy.
For a given network, I introduce the policy after 50 time steps when the equilibrium is
reached and then allow for another 50 time steps for all agents to reach their equilibrium
state. This allows for ample time to reach a stable equilibrium. I reiterate this process
for 100 networks for each parameter setting and report averages.
5.3.2.1 Inequality
The distribution under inequality is similar to the previous case, i.e. the low endowment
group has an initial human capital endowment of $10,000 while the high endowment
group starts with an initial human capital, h0, endowment of $50,000. This yields
a Gini-Coefficient of Gini = 0.41 based on c1. Notice that in the case of the equal
distribution, the Gini is not equal to 0 because even though all agents start at the same
human capital endowment, small differences arise due to their position in the network
which yields different outcomes for c1.
Chapter 5. Key Players 97
h0 c0 e0 h1 c1 α0 τ0 U Aggr. U Gini
50,000 38,230 11,770 72,783 72,783 0 0 108.73 217.45 0.02
10,000 7,657 2,343 14,569 14,569 0 0 92.64 207.23 0.41
Table 5.7: Inequality with 10 Agents- Low Endowment
h0 c0 e0 h1 c1 α0 τ0 U Aggr. U Gini
50,000 38,230 11,770 72,783 72,783 0 0 108.73 217.45 0.02
90,000 69,199 20,801 130,206 130,206 0 0 114.59 207.23 0.41
Table 5.8: Inequality with 10 Agents- High Endowment
As before, we can see that the overall utility decreases, caused by the decreasing marginal
utility. We will examine in the next section analogously to the previous section the effect
of a redistribution process.
5.3.2.2 Subsidies with 10 Agents
We can see that again as in the case with two agents aggregate utility increases through
the subsidy. Not only is the average utility higher, but utility is actually higher in
each one of the simulation runs. We can also observe that the inequality decreases to
Gini = 0.33.
h0 c0 e0 h1 c1 α0 τ0 U Aggr. U Gini
10,000 7,657 2,343 14,569 14,569 0 0 92.64 207.23 0.41
10,000 9,663 4,337 33,501 33,501 4,000 0 95.49 209.15 0.33
Table 5.9: Subsidies with 10 Agents Low Endowment
h0 c0 e0 h1 c1 α0 τ0 U Aggr. U Gini
90,000 69,199 20,801 130,206 130,206 0 0 114.59 207.23 0.41
90,000 67,115 18,885 111,209 111,209 0 4,000 113.66 209.15 0.33
Table 5.10: Subsidies with 10 Agents High Endowment
As in the case of two agents, it was possible to alleviate the effects of inequality through
the transfer system. However, the increased size of the network raises additional ques-
tions regarding a more efficient way to provide the transfer. Until now the recipient of
the subsidy was randomly selected and then depending on the position of the agent,
this caused stronger or weaker peer effects as the ’shock’ was propagated through the
network. The next section will explore whether a policy maker could take advantage of
the knowledge of the network position of individuals and what effects this will have on
overall utility and inequality.
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5.3.3 Key Player Policy
Until now, the educational subsidy was provided to a randomly chosen agent from the
low endowment group. While this choice is interpreted as random given the limited
characteristics that are available in the model, it could be interpreted as the real life
equivalent of a choice based on alternative characteristics of the agents. Put differently,
from the perspective of the position of agents in the networks the allocation appears
random as it does not take centrality into account. This does not obviate however,
that the choice was based on other factors that are outside of the scope of this model.
While this increased overall utility and reduced inequality, the policy did not take into
account the position of individuals in the network of agents and the resulting differences
in peer effects. In this section, I examine how the result of such a policy can change if
the underlying network of individuals is taken into account. The motivation for this is
twofold. On the one hand, it is obviously in the interest of the policy maker to increase
the social multiplier effect as the overall benefit of the group might be increased while
keeping the costs constant. For this reason, it might appear straightforward to simply
make the most central individuals the recipients of the subsidy and thereby increase and
potential peer effect (since more central individuals would appear to be more influential
and thereby affect more agents in the network compared to less central recipients). On
the other hand, since the inequality is also a concern to the policy maker (which is why
the transfer is introduced in the first place), it is not quite clear, which policy should
be chosen to reduce the inequality between individuals. Figure 5.11 from the previous
section displays the nature of the problem of focusing on central agents. We exacerbate
the concentration of activity levels that occur at the very core of the network while
neglecting the activity levels of agents in the periphery of the network. Under the goal
of inequality it might appear more sensible to choose less central individuals to avoid
a concentration of the educational subsidies within a very central group while leaving
behind the peripheral agents in the network. For this reason, we now compare the
effectiveness of the policy when we use different characteristics to provide the subsidy
such as the centrality of potential candidates.
5.3.3.1 No Policy Vs Random Policy with 100 Agents
For ease of comparison I first report the same comparisons as in the previous Section
5.3.2.2. I first compare the random allocation of the subsidy to 10 agents to the case of
no subsidy. Introducing the policy increases utility significantly, since any redistributive
policy will yield an overall increase of utility due to the fact that the utility function
features decreasing marginal utility. We also see in the right panel of Figure 5.5 how
inequality decreases. These are the same results as in Tables 5.9 and 5.10.
Chapter 5. Key Players 99
Figure 5.5: Overall Utility and Gini- Comparing no policy to random policy
Figure 5.6 then shows how utilities of both groups develop differently, as the group A
observes an increase in utility while utility for group B decreases through the policy.
Figure 5.6: Utility Group A and Group B- Comparing no policy to random policy
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5.3.3.2 Random Policy Vs Central Policy with 100 Agents
I next compare the utility levels from before to a policy where agents are chosen based on
their centrality in the network. Specifically, all potential recipients of the subsidy from
group A are ranked based on their centrality, and then the agent with the respective
highest measure is chosen. I employ the same 6 centrality measures as before.
The results obtained from the various centrality measures are very similar as the rankings
based on centrality only differ slightly. This is caused by the network structure which
results in an overlap in the ordering according the centrality measures (e.g. the agent who
has the highest Degree centrality also happens to have the highest Closeness centrality).
For this reason, I do not distinguish between results among the various measures but
rather use averages over all measures instead.
I create 100 different networks and for each network I choose the recipients based on
each of the centrality measures listed above and randomly. Then, I take the average
utility values that result from the centrality measures and compare those to the utility
levels that result from the random choice.
Figure 5.7 shows how utility is actually increasing more under the centrally chosen
policy (all reported changes are significant at the 1% level unless reported otherwise).
However, this comes at the cost of a higher inequality as shown by the higher Gini
coefficient in the right panel of Figure 5.7. Therefore, we can see that providing the
subsidy to the most central agent in the network causes an increase in overall utility as
this increase in educational investment disseminates through the network and causes a
stronger effect on the peers of the receiving individual. However, this focus on the central
agents in the network also causes an increase in the inequality of the network. This
results appears counter-intuitive as the overall goal of the subsidy policy was to reduce
inequality through a transfer from the high endowment group to the low endowment
group. It would thus appear to be serving both goals to choose a more central recipient
of the transfer, as this would cause a higher impact of the policy. However, as more
central agents have a higher educational investment level other things being equal, they
already are ahead of their peers in terms of income. Choosing them as recipients then
reinforces this status quo and meanwhile neglects agents in the periphery of the network
with lower incomes.
Figure 5.8 shows how the central policy yields higher utility levels for the receiving
agents while yielding slighty higher (but not significantly higher) results for group B.
These findings indicate that a policy that is targeted at the most central agents can
indeed yield a higher dissemination of the intended policy measure but will also neglect
individuals who are not very prone to be influential on their peers. The possibility for
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Figure 5.7: Utility and Gini Coefficient
such a detrimental effect suggests that such a policy would require a very careful design
in order to avoid negative outcomes.
Figure 5.8: Utility for Group A and Group B
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5.4 Sensitivity Analysis
In order to test for the robustness of the obtained results, the main findings are sub-
jected to a sensitivity analysis. In particular, the parameters γ, β, and ψ are varied
systematically within meaningful boundaries (e.g. β > 1 is excluded from the analy-
sis), by first increasing the parameters either by 10% and 20% and then decreasing it
by the same increments. Furthermore, I vary the number of connections each agent is
allowed to have, that is parameter k, by allowing up to 10 connections in increments
of 2. Then, instead of allowing each agent to have the same number of connections, I
relax this assumption and introduced a degree distribution (such as Power-law degree
distributions) that match more closely what can be observed empirically. Specifically,
for each individual, ki is drawn from a lognormal distribution that allows to create a
degree distribution with very few agents having a very high Degree while the majority
of agents has only a small number of connections. Figure 5.9 depicts the normalized
Degree densities for the case k = ki ∀i and the lognormal distribution of ki.
Figure 5.9: Kernel Density of Degree Distribution
In order to emulate empirically observed networks10, I allow for individuals to choose
their connections based on preferences such as homophily, where individuals prefer con-
nections to agents of their own type and clustering, where agents choose a certain fraction
of their friends randomly and a certain fraction based on their friend’s connections. Both
10The National Longitudinal Study of Adolescent to Adult Health (Add Health) dataset for instance
provides a nationally representative sample of high school student networks
Chapter 5. Key Players 103
of these mechanisms allow to create networks that match more closely the empirically ob-
served ones. Alternatively, individuals have a certain preference to connect to their own
group, i.e. homophily is introduced. A third specification allows individuals to choose
a certain fraction of friends randomly and then lets them pick additional connections
from the list of their friends’ friends (this allows for clustering). These modifications of
the initial random graph, allow to introduce more realistic graphs as we observe them
in reality, specifically with regard to the degree distributions, as it allows for fat tails.
All two graphs are plotted below for one simulation run.
Figure 5.10: Network Graph with 50 Agents and Homophily
Additionally, some of the assumptions made in the model regarding the government
budget are relaxed, such that the government budget only has to be balanced over both
periods, i.e. restriction 5.8 is replaced with:
∑
i∈ν
τ i0 + τ
i
1 =
∑
i∈ν
αi0 + α
i
1 (5.14)
(5.15)
This allows to raise the income to finance subsidies in the next period after the subsidies
are distributed.
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Figure 5.11: Network Graph with 50 Agents with Clustering
In all of the performed variations the main findings did not change qualitatively. Another
variation included targeting the least central agents. In this setting the overall utility
that resulted from the policy was lower compared to the random allocation and the
’centralized’ allocation. This finding confirms the previous findings that a centralized
allocation can increase overall welfare while an allocation to less central agents yields
lower spill over effects. In terms of the effect inequality, the effect was not significantly
different from the random allocation. Furthermore, a policy targeted at the median
agent yielded results very close to the random allocation in terms of overall welfare and
inequality.
In order to ensure the stability of the equilibrium, for each simulation run I initiate the
endogenous variable h1 with random numbers to determine the uniqueness of equilibrium
values. In addition, to determine whether the system was stable, I perturbed the model
after a stable value was reached with random vales for h1. Figure 5.12 displays such a
process for one run and how the h1 for each agent returned to their equilibrium again.
The model returned to the initial steady state in all of these cases.
Chapter 5. Key Players 105
Agent 0 Agent 1 Agent 2 Agent 3 Agent 4
Agent 5 Agent 6 Agent 7 Agent 8 Agent 9
20000
40000
60000
80000
100000
120000
20000
40000
60000
80000
100000
120000
0 20 40 60 80 0 20 40 60 80 0 20 40 60 80 0 20 40 60 80 0 20 40 60 80
Time
h 1
Figure 5.12: Perturbation of Equilibrium
5.5 Conclusion
The labor economics literature has by now established the paramount role of social
networks in determining the labor market outcomes of individuals. To a large extent the
empirical literature provides a number of natural experiments that identify significant
network effects on labor market outcomes (see for instance Bayer et al. (2008), Beaman
(2012), Kramarz and Skans (2010), Munshi (2003), Munshi and Rosenzweig (2006)).
While these analyses have provided a great deal of evidence, these type of interaction
effects are not very prominent when it comes to labor market policies. From a policy
maker’s perspective the mere existence of such neighborhood effects merit some attention
as these regional shocks or policy interventions leads to spill-over effects on non-treated
individuals, i.e. social multipliers arise.
The dissemination of job information is often investigated as one of the primary aspects
of social networks. Other aspects such as the peer influence play a similarly important
role. In this paper I demonstrate how the knowledge of the existence of such effects can
be taken into account when deciding about the provision of educational trainings in the
hope to increase the potential multiplier effects to other non-treated individuals in the
network. I investigate the neighborhood effects that emerge by providing individuals
within a network with such a labor market training subsidy that allows them to invest
into their human capital.
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Using a unique approach of re-distribution of funds within a group of agents, I analyze the
effects of transfer policy that chooses agents not randomly but based on their centrality
within the social network. The goal of this approach is to determine how the overall
utility and the inequality within the network would be affected by the policy. Focusing
on both aspects allows us to gauge effects that cannot be trivially determined a priori.
The computational results indicate that it is indeed possible for policy interventions to
exert social multiplier effects, i.e. to achieve a significant increase in the overall welfare
by making very central individuals the recipients of the policy. However, this type
of targeting of central individuals introduces a trade-off regarding the inequality, i.e.
a centrally allocated subsidy increases inequality significantly compared to a random
allocation of the subsidy. This is caused by the fact that central agents are already
characterized by a very high level of educational attainment and by a targeting them,
this relative advantage is exacerbated. These findings suggest that any policy measure
that targets central individuals does not unequivocally yield positive aggregate outcomes.
Rather, it would need to be carefully designed in order to avoid such negative outcomes
regarding inequality.
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5.6 Appendix
5.6.1 Deriving the Best-Response Function
The model is reproduced for convenience:
max
cit
U = lnci0 + βlnci1
s.t.
yit = h
i
t ∗ l¯it ∀ t = 0, 1 (5.16)
yˆit = y
i
t − τ it ∀ t = 0, 1 (5.17)
yˆit = c
i
t + e
i
t − αit ∀ t = 0 (5.18)
yˆit = c
i
t ∀ t = 1 (5.19)
hit+1 = h
i
t + e
i
t(1 + ψ) + γ
∑
j∈ν,j 6=i
gije
i
te
j
t ∀ t = 0 (5.20)∑
i∈ν
τ it =
∑
i∈ν
αit ∀ t = 0, 1 (5.21)
hi0 = h
0
∀i ∈ ν
Setting l¯it = 1, we substitute constraint 5.16 into constraint 5.17:
yˆit = h
i
t − τ it ∀ t = 0, 1 (5.22)
Then we substitute this expression into constraint 5.18:
hit − τ it = cit + eit − αit ∀ t = 0 (5.23)
Now we solve constraint 5.23 for eit in t = 0:
ei0 = h
i
0 − τ i0 − ci0 + αi0 (5.24)
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and in t = 1
ei1 = 0 (5.25)
Substituting this into the transition equation in order to replace ei0 (and e
j
0) from the
original problem yields:
hi1 = h
i
0 + e
i
0(1 + ψ) + γ
∑
j∈ν,j 6=i
gije
i
0e
j
0
hi1 = h
i
0 + [h
i
0 − τ i0 − ci0 + αi0](1 + ψ) + γ
∑
j∈ν,j 6=i
gij [h
i
0 − τ i0 − ci0 + αi0][hj0 − τ j0 − cj0 + αj0]
Now the problem becomes:11
max
cit
U = lnci0 + βln[hi1 − τ i1]
s.t.
hi1 = h
i
0 + [h
i
0 − τ i0 − ci0 + αi0](1 + ψ) + γ
∑
j∈ν,j 6=i
gij [h
i
0 − τ i0 − ci0 + αi0][hj0 − τ j0 − cj0 + αj0]∑
i∈ν
τ it =
∑
i∈ν
αit ∀ t = 0, 1
hi0 = h
0
∀i = 1, ..., n.
We now consider the constraint that requires that the government budget constraint to
be balanced at all times, i.e.:
∑
i∈ν
τ it =
∑
i∈ν
αit ∀ t = 0, 1
11To avoid any lack of generality the superscript i is not omitted at this point from any parameter or
variable
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We now solve the constraint for τ it (in the subsequent analysis we are going to solve the
problem from the perspective of agent i ∈ ν
τ it =
∑
i∈ν
αit −
∑
i∈ν\i
τ it ∀ t = 0, 1
We can now insert τ it into the transition equation of agent i, i.e.:
hi1 = h
i
0 + [h
i
0 − τ i0 − ci0 + αi0](1 + ψ) + γ
∑
j∈ν,j 6=i
gij [h
i
0 − τ i0 − ci0 + αi0][hj0 − τ j0 − cj0 + αj0]
hi1 = h
i
0 + h
i
0(1 + ψ)− [
∑
i∈ν
αi0 −
∑
i∈ν\i
τ i0](1 + ψ)− ci0(1 + ψ) + αi0(1 + ψ)
+ γ
∑
j∈ν,j 6=i
gij [h
i
0 − [
∑
i∈ν
αi0 −
∑
i∈ν\i
τ i0]− ci0 + αi0][hj0 − τ j0 − cj0 + αj0]
hi1 = h
i
0(2 + ψ)− [
∑
i∈ν
αi0 −
∑
i∈ν\i
τ i0](1 + ψ)− ci0(1 + ψ) + αi0(1 + ψ)
+ γ
∑
j∈ν,j 6=i
gij [h
i
0 − [
∑
i∈ν
αi0 −
∑
i∈ν\i
τ i0]− ci0 + αη0][hj0 − τ j0 − cj0 + αj0]
hi1 = h
i
0(2 + ψ)− [
∑
i∈ν\i
αi0 −
∑
i∈ν\i
τ i0](1 + ψ)− ci0(1 + ψ)
+ γ
∑
j∈ν,j 6=i
gij [h
i
0 − [
∑
i∈ν\i
αi0 −
∑
i∈ν\i
τ i0]− ci0][hj0 − τ j0 − cj0 + αj0]
In order to simplify notation we set:
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ρj0 = [h
j
0 − τ j0 − cj0 + αj0]
µj0 = [
∑
i∈ν\i
αi0 −
∑
i∈ν\i
τ i0] = τ
i
0 − αi0
θ = γ
∑
j∈ν,j 6=i
gijρ
j
0
κ =
∑
i∈ν
αi1 −
∑
i∈ν\i
τ i1 = τ
i
1
ζj0 = γ
∑
j∈ν,j 6=i
gij(h
j
0 − cj0)
and obtain:
hi1 = h
i
0(2 + ψ)− µj0(1 + ψ)− ci0(1 + ψ) + [hi0 − µj0 − ci0]γ
∑
j∈ν,j 6=i
gij [h
j
0 − τ j0 − cj0 + αj0]
hi1 = h
i
0(2 + ψ)− µj0(1 + ψ)− ci0(1 + ψ) + [hi0 − µj0 − ci0]γ
∑
j∈ν,j 6=i
gijρ
j
0
hi1 = h
i
0(2 + ψ)− µj0(1 + ψ)− ci0(1 + ψ) + [hi0 − µj0 − ci0]θ
Pluggin this back into the original problem then gives us the final maximization problem
(remember that c1 = h1 − κ):
Final Maximization Problem
max
cit
U = ln[ci0] + βln[hi0(2 + ψ)− µj0(1 + ψ)− ci0(1 + ψ) + [hi0 − µj0 − ci0]θ − κ]
s.t.
hi0 = h
i
∀i ∈ ν
Taking the derivative of U w.r.t. c00 gives us:
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∂U
∂cio
=
1
ci0
− β 1 + ψ + θ
hi0(2 + ψ)− µj0(1 + ψ)− ci0(1 + ψ) + [hi0 − µj0 − ci0]θ − κ
!
= 0
Rearranging yields:
1
ci0
= β
1 + ψ + θ
hi0(2 + ψ)− µj0(1 + ψ)− ci0(1 + ψ) + [hi0 − µj0 − ci0]θ − κ
hi0(2 + ψ)− µj0(1 + ψ)− ci0(1 + ψ) + [hi0 − µj0 − ci0]θ − κ
1
= βci0
1 + ψ + θ
1
hi0(2 + ψ)− µj0(1 + ψ)− ci0(1 + ψ) + [hi0 − µj0 − ci0]θ − κ = βci0[1 + ψ + θ]
hi0(2 + ψ)− µj0(1 + ψ) + [hi0 − µj0]θ − κ = βci0[1 + ψ + θ] + ci0(1 + ψ) + ci0θ
hi0(2 + ψ)− µj0(1 + ψ) + [hi0 − µj0]θ − κ = ci0[β[1 + ψ + θ] + 1 + ψ + θ]
hi0(2 + ψ)− µj0(1 + ψ) + [hi0 − µj0]θ − κ = ci0[(1 + β)[1 + ψ + θ]]
ci0 =
hi0(2 + ψ)− µj0(1 + ψ) + [hi0 − µj0]θ − κ
(1 + β)[1 + ψ + θ]
setting taxes and subsidies zero we get:
ci0 =
hi0(2 + ψ) + h
i
0θ
(1 + β)[1 + ψ + θ]
and this is the solution from before without the taxation (remember that for zero taxes
and zero subsidies θ = ζ):
ci0 =
hi0(2 + ψ) + h
i
0ζ
j
0
(1 + β)(1 + ψ + ζj0)
ci0 =
hi0[2 + ψ + ζ
j
0 ]
(1 + β)(1 + ψ + ζj0)
We now insert ci0 into h
i
1:
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hi1 = h
i
0(2 + ψ)− µj0(1 + ψ)− ci0(1 + ψ) + [hi0 − µj0 − ci0]θ
hi1 = h
i
0(2 + ψ)− µj0(1 + ψ) + [hi0 − µj0]θ − ci0(1 + ψ)− ci0θ
hi1 = h
i
0(2 + ψ)− µj0(1 + ψ) + [hi0 − µj0]θ − ci0(1 + ψ + θ)
hi1 = h
i
0(2 + ψ) + h
i
0θ − µj0(1 + ψ)− µj0θ − ci0(1 + ψ + θ)
hi1 = h
i
0(2 + ψ + θ)− µj0(1 + ψ + θ)− ci0(1 + ψ + θ)
hi1 = h
i
0(2 + ψ + θ)− µj0(1 + ψ + θ)−
hi0(2 + ψ)− µj0(1 + ψ) + [hi0 − µj0]θ − κ
(1 + β)[1 + ψ + θ]
(1 + ψ + θ)
hi1 = h
i
0(2 + ψ + θ)− µj0(1 + ψ + θ)−
hi0(2 + ψ)− µj0(1 + ψ) + [hi0 − µj0]θ − κ
(1 + β)
hi1 = h
i
0(2 + ψ + θ)−
hi0(2 + ψ + θ)
1 + β
− h
i
0θ
1 + β
− µj0(1 + ψ + θ)−
−µj0(1 + ψ)− µj0θ
(1 + β)
+
κ
(+β
hi1 = h
i
0[(2 + ψ + θ)−
2 + ψ + θ
1 + β
]− µj0(1 + ψ + θ)− µj0
−(1 + ψ)− θ
1 + β
+
κ
(1 + β)
hi1 = h
i
0(2 + ψ + θ)[1−
1
1 + β
]− µj0(1 + ψ + θ)−
−1− ψ − θ
(1 + β)
+
κ
1 + β
hi1 = h
i
0(2 + ψ + θ)
β
1 + β
− µj0[1 + ψ + θ +
1 + ψ + θ
(1 + β)
] +
κ
1 + β
hi1 = h
i
0(2 + ψ + θ)
β
1 + β
− µj0[1 + ψ + θ][1 +
1
1 + β
] +
κ
1 + β
hi1 = h
i
0(2 + ψ + θ)
β
1 + β
− µj0[1 + ψ + θ]
2 + β
1 + β
+
κ
1 + β
We have now solved the entire problem in the sense that, given parameters for taxation
and subsidies by the government (and given an initial state of hi0) agent i has a best
response function, i.e. she can choose optimally the value of ci0 and h
i
1 in order to
maximize consumption.
Chapter 6
Conclusion
In this dissertation I provide an evaluation of three policy proposals for the areas of
education, gender inequality, and social networks. All three areas are of high relevance
in the context of labor market economics and the research in this area is an important
tool in order to provide better economic outcomes for individuals. In order to account
for the complexities of the possible effects I employed the methodological approach of
Agent-based models for all three policies.
I first looked into the possible effects of an educational voucher that is meant to alleviate
the inferior educational outcomes of students from low income families who are forced
to default into low performing public schools while increasing the competitive pressure
on public schools. I show that initial concerns that the policy might lead to ”cream
skimming” over the group of public schools are not unsubstantiated and the universal
voucher would not lead to unequivocal welfare gains. The vouchers increase the number
of students who are actually able to choose their preferred school, thereby leaving the
public schools no other choice than increasing their educational expenditure to attract
more students or prevent current students from leaving. Meanwhile, due to the positive
correlation between ability and preference for higher quality schools, the group of stu-
dents most likely to leave public schools for private schools are high ability students, thus
decreasing the welfare gains from the increased public school expenditure due to a lower
mean ability. As an alternative, I analyze the effect of so called target vouchers, which
are a function of student ability and show that these would allow to reap the benefits of
higher competition while avoiding the ”cream skimming” effect. These results indicate
that the effects of a voucher based school are highly dependant on the particular voucher
design and any implementation needs to take potential detrimental effects into account.
Furthermore, I analyze an alternative policy instrument to the fixed gender quota for the
boards of publicly listed companies as it was recently introduced in Germany (as of 2016)
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and Norway (since 2003). As the case of Norway suggested, the fixed quota can lead to
large negative effects for the targeted companies due the difficulties of filling positions
with qualified women. Due to the heterogeneous labor supply of women across sector,
some firms find it particularly difficult to fulfil the quota. For this reason, a more flexible
policy is required. I evaluate such an alternative policy, namely a tradable quota, that
would provide companies with certificates that entitle them to hire men. This would
avoid exposing firms to a fixed gender ratio and rather offer them to fill their positions
based on the number of certificates they own. Companies with more men, could then
buy certificates from companies that hire more women. Using a computational model,
the chapter demonstrates that a tradable quota is a superior alternative (in terms of
welfare) that would allow to achieve the same aggregate ratio of women to men at much
lower adjustment costs to firms.
In the last chapter, I demonstrate the effects of labor market subsidy that takes the net-
work structure that potential beneficiaries of the policy are embedded in, into account.
In the analysis, I employ a setting in which individuals maximize intertemporal utility
by choosing between consumption today and investment into their education. Hereby,
the model takes into account potential externalities introduced by the peers of each in-
dividual. That is, each agent profits from the educational investment of their peers and
vice versa. Using this setting I demonstrate how a policy that takes the network struc-
ture into account by targeting the most central agents can lead to an ambiguous effect.
While potential spill-over effects on non-treated individuals are maximized through this
strategy, inequality increases as individuals in the periphery of the network fall further
behind through this approach. These finding are in contrast to similar studies such as
Ballester et al. (2006) who argue unequivocally in favor of targeting the central agents
when it comes to breaking up crime networks. Instead, for such a ”positive” labor mar-
ket policy the effects on the overall group of agens are not as clear and indicate that a
careful design of such a policy is necessary.
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